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Abstract 
 
  Insider threat is rapidly becoming the largest information security problem that 
organizations face. With granted access to internal systems, it is becoming increasingly 
harder to protect organizations from malicious insiders. The typical methods of mitigating 
insider threat are simply not working, primarily because insider threat is a people problem 
and most mitigation strategies are geared towards profiling and anomaly detection which 
are problematic at best. As a result, a new type of model is proposed here, one that 
incorporates risk management with human behavioral science.  
  The new risk-based model focuses on observable influences that affect employees 
and identifies employees with increased risk of becoming malicious insiders. This 
research details the need for the model, the model’s components and how it works. The 
model is tested using an in-depth case study on Robert Hanssen, the FBI’s double agent 
who sold the Soviets secrets for more than twenty years. 
  The model’s main purpose is the differentiation of malicious and non-malicious 
employees. Implemented with the right tool, the new model has great potential for use by 
security personnel in their efforts to mitigate insider threat damage. 
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MITIGATING INSIDER THREAT USING 
 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR INFLUENCE MODELS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 This chapter introduces the reader to the research areas of insider threat mitigation 
and human behavior modeling. The problem is clearly defined and scoped, a proposal for 
a new model is introduced, the research objectives are identified, and finally, an overview 
of the thesis is presented. 
1.1  Mitigating Insider Threat 
The concept of mitigating insider threat is often used loosely and is frequently 
misunderstood. Many imagine mitigating insider threat is a solution to the problem, one 
that detects or catches insiders and eliminates the threat of damage. Realistically, 
however, insider threat is a much bigger problem and mitigating insider threat does not 
imply fixing or removing the threat. People define mitigating insider threat numerous 
ways, but the simplest way is to define the words separately and then combine them. 
1.1.1  Mitigate. 
To mitigate is to make milder, less harsh, less severe, or to moderate [1]. The 
definition makes no implication of eliminating, controlling, or even minimizing; it simply 
means to reduce. When an organization attempts to mitigate something, it is simply trying 
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to implement a practice that helps reduce the problem in question, in the case of this 
research, insider threat.  
1.1.2  Insider. 
An insider is any current or former employee, to include contractors, of an 
organization who is or was inside and as a result, has special information or advantages 
and has authorized physical or electronic access to organizational information and 
infrastructure resources [2-4]. Basically, an insider is anyone who has been given the right 
to access organization information and assets. 
1.1.3  Threat. 
Threat is a menace or danger of any sort, which includes situations in which an 
insider intentionally exceeds, misuses or abuses their authorized level of system access in 
a manner that adversely affects the organization's data, daily business operations, or 
system security [2-4]. In other words, threat is the consequence that happens when 
insiders misuse their granted rights. 
1.1.4  Pulling it All Together. 
Insider threat is summed up as the damage done to an organization by its own 
authorized employees, and mitigating insider threat is generating tools or research of any 
kind that reduces damage done to an organization by its authorized employees. 
Most mitigation approaches focus on methods of detecting insiders or more likely 
detecting indicators that a problem exists. Although this is necessary research, these 
detections often result in catching the insider after the damage is already done. However, 
a fundamental approach to mitigating a problem is through deterrence, and insider threat 
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is no different. By learning exactly what influences the behavior of potential malicious 
insiders, it is possible for organizations and security personnel to reduce insider threat 
damage.  
Computer security is a people problem [5], as it is people that are ultimately 
responsible for attacks against a system. This serves as the foundation for this research. 
Much research has been done on human behavior, but little has been done to tie it in with 
computer engineering models used to mitigate insider threat. It is possible to show that 
observing certain influences that affect human behavior are beneficial in computer 
modeling to identify the potential for insider damage, thus enabling security personnel to 
implement appropriate measures that mitigate the threat and reduce the amount of 
damage that occurs. 
1.2  Human Behavior 
Human Behavior is defined as a “collection of activities performed by human 
beings and influenced by culture, attitudes, emotions, values, ethics, authority, rapport, 
hypnosis, persuasion, and/or coercion.” [6] The theory behind human behavior is humans 
react to “definite objective stimuli or situations and not to subjective factors.” [2] Each of 
these statements yields key words important to this research. From the first sentence, 
influence, which is a fundamental concept used throughout this research, is defined 
below. The second sentence yields “objective stimuli or situations”, which are simply 
events. In other words, human behavior is simply the actions or reactions made by human 
beings as a result of influences and events. This is discussed further in Chapter III. 
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1.3  Influence Models 
Influence is defined as “the ability to indirectly control or affect the actions 
of…people,” [7] or “the power…of producing an effect on a person.” [2] Here, the key 
words are “indirectly control” and “produce an effect” on individuals. The model 
proposed by this research is based on the concept that human behavior is indirectly 
“controlled” by the influences that “produce an effect” on people. If human behavior is 
affected by influences, then monitoring the influences and degree of effect they have over 
employees within an organization provides insight into the potential behavior the 
organization expects the employee to exhibit. 
A model is a “conceptual object used in the creation of a predictive formula.” [8] 
A model provides a “framework for applying logic and mathematics that can be 
independently evaluated.” [9] They are common in the natural and social sciences where 
logical principles apply, but are not always completely mathematical. “Models can be 
used to implement computer simulations that illustrate behavior…over time.” [9] The 
influence model proposed here is intended to predict the potential for increased risk of 
becoming an insider threat based on the observation of influences that affect human 
behavior over time.    
1.4  Problem Statement  
The purpose of this research is to mitigate the problem of insider threat by 
proposing a new model that uses the influences that affect human behavior to predict 
employees’ potential risk of becoming malicious insiders. 
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1.5  Research Objectives 
The research objectives for this thesis are three-fold. The first objective is the 
establishment that human behavior plays an important role in mitigating insider threat. By 
considering human behavior, security personnel are able to combat insider threat just as 
readily and possibly with better success, than by only taking technical approaches, such as 
data mining email accounts or tracking logins. Additionally, by relating how influences 
affect people and the inherent risk involved from their exposure to computer systems 
containing sensitive information, it is possible to flag or generate indicators of an 
employee’s potential risk for causing insider damage.  
The second objective of this research is the creation of the Risk Predictor Model 
(RPM), a human behavior model that uses known influences on people to generate 
indicators of potential risk for insider threat. It is possible to mitigate insider threat by 
inserting specific influences and events that affect human behavior into a model that 
organizations use to identify employees with a higher risk of becoming a malicious 
insider, thus reducing the amount damage done.  
The third and final objective of this research is to show that the RPM is able to 
successfully differentiate between a normal employee and malicious one who has caused 
harm. The model, coupled with an appropriate tool, allow security personnel to 
implement appropriate measures to mitigate insider threat and reduce the amount of 
damage that occurs. 
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1.6  Scope  
Insider threat is a big problem, and no single research effort is going to solve the 
problem. Each only hopes to help in some way by targeting a specific area. This research 
focuses on the normally ethical employee who originally has no intentions of causing 
damage. This ignores employees hired with the secret intention of doing harm, as well as 
those paid by outsiders to enter an organization and do harm. By excluding people that 
already have the intent to do harm from this research, it is possible to get an idea of what 
behavioral scientists might consider the “normal” behavior of a typical employee. Using 
this as a baseline, it is possible to differentiate between employees with higher risk for 
causing damage and normal insiders. 
1.7  Preview 
 This chapter defined insider threat mitigation, human behavior, influence models, 
and why it is important to study these areas. Next, a specific problem was identified and 
the three-fold research objectives to solve this problem were introduced along with the 
overall scope of the research. A new model is needed to mitigate insider threat and by 
observing influences that affect human behavior it is possible for organizations to predict 
which employees pose a higher risk for becoming a malicious insider. 
 Chapter II reviews the ongoing research in the area of insider threat and identifies 
the need for a new model based on influences and human behavior (the first objective of 
this research). Chapter III outlines the research methodology used to build the Risk 
Predictor Model, starting with a solid foundation for the model and building up to the 
outputs the model produces to mitigate insider threat (the second objective of this 
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research). Chapter IV gives a detailed description of how the RPM is tested, starting with 
how the model is populated, continuing with an in-depth case study on a known 
malicious insider, and culminating in an analysis of the results produced by the model and 
how well the model differentiates between a malicious insider and a normal insider (the 
third objective of this research). Finally, Chapter V identifies the relevance of the model 
and the data obtained from it, as well as future work considerations, and some concluding 
remarks. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 This chapter not only reviews past and current research about insider threat and 
mitigation strategies available, but more importantly, satisfies the first objective of this 
research by identifying the need for a new model that uses influences on human behavior 
rather than computer logs and email mining to mitigate insider threat. After an initial 
discussion about why it is important to study insider threat, some relevant statistics about 
insiders are presented, followed by a discussion of mitigation strategies, with specific 
focus on risk management, which is vital to this research. Then a brief indication of the 
model format is presented, followed by a short summary.  
2.1  Why Study Insider Threat? 
Insider threat is a big problem for any organization large enough to use a 
computer network. When proprietary information is transferred across or stored on a 
network, the organization becomes susceptible to attack. Significant research has been 
conducted on finding ways to protect, react, and otherwise mitigate attack from outside 
sources, but much work is necessary to protect organizations from damage done by 
employees with legitimate access to the network. A recent Department of Defense (DoD) 
Inspector General report indicated that 87 percent of identified intruders of DoD 
information systems were insiders. The insider is different from an outsider, because they 
have been granted certain authorities and trust, and they have superior knowledge of asset 
value [3]. 
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Insider threat is a vast problem and occurs on many levels starting with accidental 
access due to ignorance of security policy and practices or carelessness. More harmful is 
disdain for security practices, which includes inappropriate display or storage of classified 
or proprietary materials, poor protection of materials such as an unattended laptop that 
contains vital information or the unauthorized destruction of classified or proprietary 
data. The worst form of insider damage comes from malicious intent which is purposeful 
compromise performed by people with the intent to do harm and often results in the 
compromise or destruction of information, or disruption of services to other insiders [3]. 
The damage, intentional or not, is staggering to an organization’s finances, reputation, 
and its people, especially if the organization has field operatives such as the United States 
(US) military, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Secret Service, etc. Insiders do 
much more, however, such as disrupt interconnected information systems, deny the use of 
information systems and data to authorized users, and remove, alter or destroy 
information. They may even use outside help to significantly increase the severity of their 
malicious activity [3]. 
“Common wisdom in the cyber security community holds that over 80% of 
recorded intrusion cases are attributed to trusted insiders, and the threat is rising.” [10] 
Insider threat is on the rise for several reasons. Espionage, specifically Post Cold War era-
type espionage, has increased with the collection and sale of technical weapons system 
information made easier through foreign visits to US facilities, joint ventures, 
conventions, and seminars, coupled with access to DoD information systems. Also, 
mindset has changed, as individuals look at selling secrets as business affairs rather than 
 10 
acts of national betrayal or treason. Furthermore, the US Government is no longer 
isolated from the public. Cleared Defense Contractor activities were traditionally isolated 
from the general population, but are now increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. 
Moreover, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products have become ubiquitous to the 
point that even the DoD acquires most of its information systems from vendors but has 
little or no knowledge of who developed the systems and, therefore, has no measure of 
the trustworthiness, reliability or loyalties of those individuals. With little or no influence 
over the development of COTS products, many organizations are in danger of deploying 
their security systems with exploitable errors or security breeches. Additionally, the rate 
at which attackers exploit holes in security has increased to the point that detection of 
malicious code has become extraordinarily difficult. Network security personnel have 
been unable to convincingly demonstrate that an information system is secure; rather they 
are only able to demonstrate the many ways it is not [3].  
2.2  Insider Threat Statistics 
There have been several studies done that have pointed to the nature of the typical 
insider. These studies focus on identifying common characteristics among apprehended 
insiders and the damage they caused. What follows here is a brief synopsis. 
In August of 2004, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
Coordination Center at Carnegie Melon University’s Software Engineering Institute and 
the United States (US) Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center conducted a 
study of 23 incidents carried out by 26 insiders in the banking and finance sector between 
1996 and 2002. “Efforts to estimate how often companies face attacks from within are 
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difficult to make. Many believe that insider attacks are under-reported to law enforcement 
agencies or prosecutors. Companies fear the negative publicity or increased liability that 
arises because of the incidents. Or, they believe that the harm suffered is not sufficient to 
warrant criminal charges.” [11] This is interesting, because many insiders do not equate 
their actions or the damages they cause to illegal activities or betrayal of country or 
organization. Most studies done on insider threat are reported from a purely technical 
perspective, relaying how the insiders accomplished their deeds, the vulnerabilities 
exploited, and possible solutions to prevent it from happening again. Although valuable, 
the significance of this study exists in the fact that it examines the threat from two 
perspectives, behavioral and technical, simultaneously; an industry first. Below are the 
seven findings the study produced. 
Finding 1: Most Incidents Required Little Technical Sophistication. Most attacks 
were not directed at information systems or network vulnerabilities, but rather against 
business rules or organization policies, and individuals had little or no technical expertise 
or made no attempts to scan for vulnerabilities prior to the incident [11]. Based on the 
statistics produced in the report (Figure 1), it is apparent that organizations are susceptible 
to insider attack from employees of all skill levels, not just computer savvy hackers. 
 
87% employed simple user commands
70% exploited business rules such as authorized overrides 
61% exploited vulnerabilities 
78% were authorized users with active computer accounts 
43% used his or her own username and password 
26% used someone else’s computer account, 
23% were employed in technical positions 
17% possessed system administrator/root access 
39% were unaware of technical security measures
 
 
Figure 1.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 1 Statistics [11] 
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Finding 2: Perpetrators Planned Their Actions. “Most of the incidents were 
thought out and planned in advance, and often included others with knowledge of the 
insider’s intentions, plans, and/or activities.” [11] Based on the statistics for this finding 
(Figure 2), it is clear that events leading up to the incidents are observable, which given 
the proper monitoring tool, makes it easier to catch insiders earlier or even before they 
attack. Additionally, increased awareness of reporting requirements could reduce the 
number of insider transgressions. 
 
81% planned their actions in advance 
85% let others have partial or full knowledge 
74% of whom stood to benefit from the activity 
26% of whom knew about it and stood to gain nothing from it! 
31% of activities or plans were noticeable 
65% did not consider the negative consequences associated with their actions 
 
Figure 2.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 2 Statistics [11] 
 
Finding 3: Financial Gain Motivated Most Perpetrators. Although this study was 
done in the financial sector, there were still significant motivations (Figure 3) for causing 
harm, other than financial reasons. Some insiders are motivated by a desire to harm the 
company or information system. Still, with greed being the overwhelming reason for 
causing harm, sudden unexplained affluence is an obvious cue to possible employees 
causing damage. 
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81% motivated by financial gain 
27% tried to sabotage business operations 
23% motivated by revenge 
19% attempted to steal proprietary information 
15% motivated by dissatisfaction with company 
15% motivated by a desire for respect 
27% had multiple motives 
 
Figure 3.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 3 Statistics [11] 
 
Finding 4: Perpetrators did not Share a Common Profile. There was a wide variety 
of employees involved in the cases represented in the report. The statistics showed that 
demographics was not the prevalent data to look at to find the insiders, behavior was 
(Figure 4). Most did not hold technical positions, with only a few technically savvy 
enough to consider themselves hackers. They were employed in various roles including 
service, clerical, professional, and technical. They ranged in age from 18 to 59, were 
married, single, male, female and came from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
Given that the employees that caused damage came from all walks of life makes it 
difficult to pinpoint where to look, but their behavior gave some insiders away. 
 
27% exhibited concerning behavior 
19% were disgruntled employees 
15% were considered difficult to manage 
4% were considered untrustworthy 
9% had a history of electronic abuses or violations 
13% had shown an interest in hacking 
27% had prior arrests 
 
Figure 4.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 4 Statistics [11] 
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Finding 5: Incidents were Detected by Various Methods and People. Surprisingly, 
the majority of insiders were not caught by security personnel or by electronic means. As 
the statistics show, they were caught by a variety of sources, both internal and external to 
the organization and through both manual and electronic means (Figure 5). The major 
underpinning here is that most insiders were not stopped via monitoring their email 
accounts or network logins, but through interaction with people. 
 
61% detected by non security personnel 
customers (35%) 
supervisors (13%) 
other non-security personnel (13%) 
39% detected by security staff 
corporate security department staff (4%) 
security staff or system administrators (13%) 
staff responsible for info systems/data (17%) 
61% caught through manual procedures 
inability to log in 
customer complaints 
manual account audits 
notification by outsiders 
26% caught through system failure or irregularities 
22% were caught through auditing or monitoring procedures 
74% of insiders’ identities were obtained using system logs 
30% required examination of the network, system, or data to help 
identify the insider 
 
Figure 5.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 5 Statistics [11] 
 
Finding 6: Victim Organizations Suffered Financial Loss. Given the study on the 
financial sector, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of organizations 
suffered a financial loss due to insider actions. However, as statistics show, even financial 
institutions suffered other losses, such as proprietary information or defamation of 
reputation (Figure 6). Accordingly, organizations outside the financial realm have their 
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share of financial loss due to insider damage, but stand to lose more when insiders sell 
secrets and betray national security.  
 
91% of insider activity had at least one other adverse impact on the organization 
Damage to business operations (30%) 
Damage to reputation (26%) 
100% attacks affected security of the organizations’ data 
22% were targeted against the security of the organizations’ information 
systems/networks 
9% were targeted against network, components or external connectivity 
78% involved modification and/or deletion of information 
 
Figure 6.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 6 Statistics [11] 
 
Finding 7: Perpetrators Committed Acts While on the Job. This refutes the notion 
that spies and embezzlers sneak into the work place late at night when no one is looking 
in order to carry out their crimes. The statistics show quite the contrary, as most 
employees have little trouble causing damage right from their desks at work during duty 
hours (Figure 7). It appears that employees feel safe enough to perform illicit acts without 
fear of reprisal. 
 
83% launched within the workplace 
70% took place during normal working hours 
30% carried out from the insiders’ homes through remote 
access 
54% involved actions from both the workplace and from 
home 
 
Figure 7.  Secret Service/CERT 2004 Insider Threat Study Finding 7 Statistics [11] 
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This was a powerful study because it is recent (2004) and because it considered 
both technical and behavioral implications for the first time. It produced several key 
insights into the nature of the insider as well. Most attackers exhibit one or more of the 
following observable behaviors. They  
• have a wide range of skills, often not technical in nature, 
• plan their attacks, share their intents with others, maybe even coworkers, 
• are motivated by financial gain, but usually have multiple motives,  
• do not share a common profile, but rather a common set of observable behaviors, 
• are caught not by security personnel and fancy software, but by people, manually, 
• cause organizations loss of data and reputation as well as financial loss, 
• attack at the office during normal duty hours, in the face of security, and feel safe. 
The underlying theme to these findings is that insiders throw behavioral signals 
that supervisors and security personnel need to watch for. Organizations need to instill the 
importance of proper reporting procedures, lest anyone in the organization feels the need 
to report someone acting out of the ordinary. Proper reporting of observable behavior 
provides leverage to security personnel.  
2.3  Mitigation Strategies  
Mitigation strategies for insider threat are rare for several reasons. First, it is a 
hard problem, that deals with people and people are not easily categorized, or lumped into 
good and bad groups from which to select. The simple fact that no two people are alike 
makes it difficult to introduce sound mitigation strategies, and as a result, few exist.   
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Second, “among the approaches for detecting insider abuse, profiling is the 
favored technology, and its preferred implementation mechanism, especially given a goal 
of detecting novel attacks or abuses, is anomaly detection.” [10] Unfortunately, profiling 
yields few conclusive factors, except for the fact that insiders come from all walks of life, 
with vastly different skill sets (some technical and some non-technical), are hard working, 
dedicated individuals, loyal US citizens, and often have security clearances. Since it is 
difficult to identify a single profile, or even a broad one that successfully identifies 
malicious insiders, it is clear that profiling is not the best solution to mitigating insider 
threat. However, one fact remains; all insiders that caused damage were human and as a 
result are susceptible to influences that affect human behavior. Rather than generating a 
single profile that attempts to capture the nebulous essence of malicious insiders, 
concentrating on the influences that affect the behavior of employees yields interesting 
results. 
Third, and most significantly, most mitigation strategies focus on how incidents 
are executed, detected, and the insider identified. This is mostly effective in stopping 
insiders after significant damage has already occurred. By monitoring networks, email 
accounts, logins, building accesses, etc., security personnel watch employees’ normal 
everyday work pattern, identifying an anomaly here or there, without raising suspicion. 
However, when anomalies begin to add up, it is time to act, but by then, it is often too late 
because the damage is done. Although these are still valuable techniques that require 
more research, there is little research in identifying the physical and observable behaviors 
and interactions that insiders engage in before the incidents occur. By identifying 
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employees with a higher risk for causing damage, indicators identified by existing sources 
hold more value, meaning less are required to occur before security personnel engage, 
thus reducing the amount of damage the insider causes.  
There are, however, some strategies that show promise, such as anomaly 
detection. However, most anomaly detection techniques are not preemptive and often 
require multiple anomalies to occur before action is taken. For example, detecting 
unauthorized access to classified information is useful, but late. Additionally, by 
definition, an anomaly is an outlier, and security personnel ignore one, two, or even three 
anomalies before acting on a trend four or more anomalies. As a result, by the time action 
is taken, significant damage has already been done. 
2.4  Risk Management 
A good insider threat mitigation strategy is risk based. Risk is defined as the 
probability or chance of encountering harm or loss [1, 3]. Risk management is the act or 
manner of managing, controlling or regulating risk [1]. The DoD definition states that 
risk management is a decision making process involving relevant risk assessments based 
on a function of three variables; criticality, vulnerability, and threat. Criticality represents 
how important the asset is to the mission, vulnerability suggests the ways to compromise, 
exploit, damage or destroy the asset, and threat characterizes who intends to exploit a 
vulnerability, against what, and what capabilities they possess to do so [3]. The DoD has 
adopted a 7-segment model where risk occurs at the intersection of criticality, 
vulnerability, and threat (Figure 8). Each segment is defined in a legend (Figure 9).  
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Figure 8.  DoD Risk Model [3] 
 
1 - Critical assets (information, systems, programs, people, equipment or 
facilities) for which there is no known vulnerability and no known threat 
2 - Vulnerabilities in systems, programs, people, equipment or facilities that are 
not associated with critical assets and for which there is no known threat 
3 - Threat environment for which there is no known threat to critical assets or 
access to vulnerabilities (or vulnerability information).
4 - Critical assets for which there are known vulnerabilities, but no known threat 
exposure.
5 - 
Critical assets for which there are known vulnerabilities and threat exposure.
6 - Threat has acquired specific knowledge and/or capability to exploit a 
vulnerability although not a critical asset vulnerability.
7 - Critical asset for which there are no known vulnerabilities, but there is 
exposure to a specific threat.
 
Figure 9.  Legend for Numbered Segments of DoD Risk Model [3] 
 
The segments of interest appear where the three variables criticality, vulnerability, 
and threat intersect. For purposes of this research, segment 7 is ignored because in theory, 
even a highly critical asset that is invulnerable (improbable) is unlikely to sustain damage 
even under severe threat. Likewise, segment 4 is ignored because in the face of no threats 
(also improbable), even a critical system with vulnerabilities is unlikely to sustain 
2
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3
Threat
1
Criticality
4 5 6
7
RISK
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damage, at least until a perceived threat surfaces. This leaves segments 6 and 5, where in 
the former, a threat to a non-critical but vulnerable system is potentially harmful, and in 
the latter, all three variables collide representing the highest risk possible. Segment 6 
remains a concern for this research because insider damage comes in many forms, 
including organization reputation, for example, which potentially suffers at the hand of 
insiders without access to critical information. 
The next step is to categorize insiders into the model. Since this is a risk model, 
not a police blotter, it is not an insult to employees if all employees are considered 
threats, since it is true that each employee in an organization, from top to bottom, is a 
potential threat to the organization. 
Next, all organization assets, critical or otherwise, are considered vulnerable, 
because employees are granted rights and privileges to use company assets as a condition 
of their employment, that is what makes them insiders. This falls under segment 6, and by 
entering critical assets into the equation, segment 5, extreme risk is reached. The 
criticality of organization assets is constant here; it does not change based on the 
organizations employees. Likewise, the vulnerabilities created by giving those employees 
jobs does not change either (this is separate from inherent vulnerabilities not associated 
with employees, such as unsecured vaults, faulty programming, etc.). This indicates an 
important fact; the amount of risk an organization undertakes is directly proportional to 
the risk each of its employees poses to the organization. By determining which employees 
pose the highest threat to an organization, security personnel are able to act accordingly to 
mitigate the potential for damage. 
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In summary, mitigating insider threat is a hard problem that requires knowledge of 
human behavior. Strategies structured around mitigating risks inherent in an 
organization’s employees are necessary, but there is a lack of good models that show 
increased risk. Coupled with the fact that most mitigation strategies focus on insiders’ 
current actions, which are looked at in a vacuum, rather than attempting to ascertain the 
potential risk an employee has for causing harm in the first place, it becomes clear that a 
new type of model involving human behavior is in order. Because humans are so vastly 
different, it becomes necessary to study human behavior to help with mitigation 
strategies. By learning which indicators are not only important, but also observable, it is 
possible to put them into a model useful in mitigating insider threat. 
2.5  Model Format  
The first thing to determine before developing a model using human behavior 
characteristics to mitigate insider threat is to model. Based on the following research done 
on insider threat, it becomes clear how to build a new model using human behavior as its 
inputs. 
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations conducted a recent study (2005) of 
154 cases of insider espionage from 1945 to 2004. They defined espionage as “the 
process of obtaining military, political, commercial, or other secret information by means 
of spies, secret agents, or illegal monitoring devices.” [12] This is important because it 
twists the usual notion that insiders only cause damage by transmitting information over 
the computer where some high tech security software might catch it, but rather implies 
that it is not always a computer issue; it is a human one. The study found that in 68% of 
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the cases the insider volunteered the information, 12% were recruited by friends or 
family, and only 20% were actually recruited by foreign intelligence and that the 
motivations for spying were greed, revenge, ideological, sympathy for cause, and 
recognition or power [12]. This is significant because a vast majority of insiders are not 
coerced into betraying their country or government, yet their motivations stem from 
human emotions. As a result, the study produced a key set of indicators for organizations 
to look for to detect espionage activity (Figure 10). These indicators are important 
because they represent the observable behaviors that are used to build a model that is 
useful in mitigating insider threat. 
 
Having a mysterious source of income
Working odd hours when others are not in the office
Taking classified materials home or on trips (mishandling)
Bringing cameras or recording devices into restricted areas
Excessive and/or unexplained use of digital equipment (thumb drives)
Life-style inconsistent with known income
Pattern of unreported foreign travel and/or foreign contact
Anti-Semitic views against the US/sympathetic views towards other countries
 
Figure 10.  AFOSI Key Indicators of Espionage Activity [12] 
 
2.6  Summary 
This chapter has shown that first, it is important to study insider threat because it 
is a hard problem that lacks good mitigation strategies. Second, insider threat is a people 
problem, where profiling and anomaly detection seem to show the best results, but 
unfortunately are often unsuccessful or too late. As a result, since insiders have proven to 
come from all walks of life with differing skill sets and a vast range of motivations, it is 
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clear that a new form of model is needed. Third, this model needs to incorporate the 
principles of risk management, which provides a good framework for mitigating insider 
threat, and human behavior analysis, or more specifically, the influences that govern 
human behavior. By monitoring how influences affect human behavior, it becomes 
possible to insert influences into a model and present an assessment of an employee’s risk 
for becoming a malicious insider. As a result, the first objective of this thesis has been 
met, by identifying the need for a new model, the Risk Predictor Model (RPM), which 
uses the influences that affect employees to determine an employee’s level of risk for 
becoming an insider threat to the organization. Chapter III details the development of the 
model and Chapter IV tests the model to show that is capable of differentiating between 
malicious and non-malicious insiders.   
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III.  Methodology 
 
Chapter II presented material outlining the need for a new and different kind of 
model to mitigate insider threat. This chapter focuses on the methodology of building the 
Risk Predictor Model, starting with a thorough review of the concepts that are 
fundamental to the model’s construction. Then a formal definition of the model and 
mathematics involved is presented. Finally, a detailed description of the model’s inputs, 
mathematics, and outputs, along with their usefulness is presented, prior to a short 
summary about the model. 
3.1  Model Inception 
Early discussion with the research sponsor [13] resulted in a relational diagram of 
an organization where the individuals in the organization have certain influences over 
each other (Figure 11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Model Showing Relationships Between Members of an Organization [13] 
Employee 
Supervisor 
Co-worker 
Co-worker 
Subordinate 
Secretary 
CEO 
Customer 
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This model demonstrates the importance of relationships between the members of 
an organization. More importantly, it shows that certain members of the organization hold 
more influence over other members in the organization. For example, although the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of an organization resides at the top of the organizational chart, 
it is the CEO’s secretary that is tied into all aspects of the organization, not the CEO. 
Likewise, the secretaries’ influence over other employees is perceived great, due to the 
single influence the CEO has over the secretary. In other words, employees accept that 
correspondence from the secretary is the result of action taken by the CEO and therefore 
value the secretaries’ influence as if it were from the CEO. As a result, it is clear that a 
model based on relationships and the influences these relationships have on each of the 
entities within the model is helpful in mitigating the insider threat problem. 
The model in Figure 11 is just the foundation for the model developed in this 
research. For an effective model, it is important to look at a number of business dynamics 
principles [14]. First, develop the model to solve a particular problem, not to model the 
system, (in this case, to alert security personnel of employees with higher risk of 
performing insider damage). Second, a good model does not stand alone, and although 
the model proposed here provides interesting insight into the risk an employee displays, 
the model outputs are indicators to evaluate with other indicators before action is taken. 
Lastly, modeling works best as an iterative process, so the model is developed in a way 
such that additional future inputs are made available to the model for evaluation. The 
model is capable of evaluating the data over time, not just as a one-time snapshot of the 
situation. Given enough time, the model is capable of trend analysis as well. 
 26 
Next, it is important to develop how to model the relationships and how the links 
between relationships are quantified. Since it is relationships between people, or more 
precisely, the influences that effect people that are modeled, a causal relationship is used. 
In this type of modeling, relationships are linked together when one entity has some effect 
over another entity. Likewise, the link between them is quantified, and in this case is the 
amount of effect, either positive or negative, one entity has over the other. It is also 
important to note that “social dynamics are fraught with counterintuitive behavior” [15]. 
Figure 12 illustrates this; smoking, arteries, weight, anxiety, lungs, and heart are entities 
linked together by causal relationships. Directionality, also required to evaluate causal 
relationships is also illustrated.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Model Showing Counterintuitive Behavior [15] 
 
In this example, it is possible to derive several relationships between the entities. 
Smoking hardens the arteries and damages the lungs, which is bad for your heart; 
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however, smoking also helps control weight and acts as an anxiety reducer for smokers, 
which has a positive effect on the heart [15]. So, the act of smoking has both positive and 
negative effects on the heart. It is the idea that multiple entities, or in the case of the Risk 
Predictor Model, influences, effect other entities in both positive and negative ways that 
becomes the foundation for the model.  
It is established that the model has entities that represent relationships, or more 
specifically, influences, and these entities are connected together by links that hold certain 
weights. For the purposes of this research, the model is loosely designed as a polytomous 
Rasch model. “The polytomous Rasch model is a measurement model that has potential 
application in any context in which the objective is to measure a trait or ability through a 
process in which responses to items are scored with successive integers.” [16] Developed 
in 1978 by Andrich, the relevant terms of Rasch’s 1961 derivations are resolved into 
threshold and discrimination parameters. “Rasch models provide a foundation for the 
measurement of quantitative attributes and traits on a continuum, based on categorical 
data derived from interactions between persons and items. In principle, Rasch models are 
applied in any experimental context in which persons interact with assessment questions 
or items in a manner that provides for comparisons between persons with respect to the 
magnitude of some attribute or trait.” [17] This leads to a model that contains human 
influences as entities and uses integers to represent the magnitude each influence has over 
the others. 
The magnitudes of the links are represented by integers, but the degree they are 
computed to is still undetermined. When Andrich developed the polytomous Rasch 
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model, he used the Likert scale [16].  The Likert scale, invented in 1932 by Rensis Likert, 
is a type of psychometric scale often used in questionnaires, where respondents specify 
their level of agreement to each of a list of statements [18]. ”Psychometrics is the field of 
study concerned with the theory and technique of psychological measurement, which 
includes the measurement of knowledge, abilities, attitudes, and personality traits.” [19] 
A traditional Likert scale uses a five-point bipolar measurement to indicate the degree of 
agreement with a statement and being bipolar, the measurement considers both positive 
and negative slants. For example, when asked if smoking is bad for your health, 
respondents are given the following choices: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. This scale has degree, evidenced by the 
difference between agree and strongly agree, and is bipolar, by showing both a positive 
and negative attitude. Similarly, the question, rate your level of stress as highly stressed, 
moderately stressed, average stress, fairly unstressed, or not stressed at all, also has a 
scale that shows degree, evidenced by the difference between highly and moderately 
stressed, and has bipolarity by showing above average levels of stress as well as below 
average levels of stress. Converting the Likert scale into integers from 2 to -2 allows for 
easy incorporation into a Rasch type model. As a result, the model contains human 
influences as entities and integers from 2 to -2 represent the magnitude each influence has 
over the others. 
Next, using the DoD’s 7-segment risk model [3], and the desire to model human 
behavior, potential insiders are identified using a model built to determine employee risk 
for insider damage based on the influences over them. Using the Lowenstein Life Stress 
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Test [20] as the foundation for the influences included in the model is a reasonable place 
to start (Figure 13). The Life Stress Test is widely used by mental health professionals to 
 
 
_____ 100 Death of Spouse _____ 29Change in work responsibilities 
_____ 73 Divorce _____ 29 Trouble with in-laws 
_____ 65 Marital Separation _____ 28 Outstanding personal achievement 
_____ 63 Jail Term _____ 26 Spouse begins or stops work 
_____ 63 Death of close family member _____ 26 Starting or finishing school 
_____ 53 Personal injury or illness _____ 25 Change in living conditions 
_____ 50 Marriage _____ 24 Revision of personal habits 
_____ 47 Fired from work _____ 23 Trouble with boss 
_____ 45 Marital reconciliation _____ 20 Change in work hours, conditions 
_____ 45 Retirement _____ 20 Change in residence 
_____ 44 Change in family member's health _____ 20 Change in schools 
_____ 40 Pregnancy _____ 19 Change in recreational habits 
_____ 39 Sex difficulties _____ 19 Change in church activities 
_____ 39 Addition to family _____ 18 Change in social activities 
_____ 39 Business readjustment _____ 17 Mortgage or loan under $20,000 
_____ 38 Change in financial status _____ 16 Change in sleeping habits 
_____ 37 Death of close friend _____ 15 Change in number of family gatherings 
_____ 36 Change to a different line of work _____ 15 Change in eating habits 
_____ 35 Change in number of marital arguments _____ 13 Vacation 
_____ 31 Mortgage or loan over $30,000 _____ 12 Christmas season 
_____ 30 Foreclosure of mortgage or loan _____ 11 Minor violations of the law 
LIFE STRESS SCORES
0-149 Low susceptibility to stress-related illness
150-299 Medium susceptibility to stress-related illness.
300 and over High susceptibility to stress-related illness
This scale shows the kind of life pressure that you are facing. Depending on your 
coping skills or the lack thereof, this scale can predict the likelihood that you will fall 
victim to a stress related illness. The illness could be mild - frequent tension 
headaches, acid indigestion, loss of sleep to very serious illness like ulcers, cancer, 
migraines and the like.
In the past 12 to 24 months, which of the following major life events have taken 
place in your life? Make down the points for each event that you have experienced 
this year. When you're done looking at the whole list, add up the points for each 
event. Check your score at the bottom. 
______ Your Total Score 
 
Figure 13.  Sample Lowenstein Life Stress Test [20] 
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determine the levels of stress an individual suffers from. The test is administered in a 
questionnaire format where the respondent identifies events that have occurred within the 
last twelve to twenty-four months. Each event has a score associated with it and the sum 
of the scores relevant to the individual yields a total stress level, which is then checked 
against a susceptibility to illness gauge.  
For example, a personal injury, change in financial status, addition to the family 
and the foreclosure of a mortgage yields a score of 160, which puts an individual in the 
medium susceptibility to stress-related illness category. Similarly, these same influences 
indicate a higher potential for an individual to cause insider damage, given the financial 
hardships the individual appears to face. Examination of the events used in the Life Stress 
Test reveals another relevant point; even events that are considered good are found on the 
test, which negatively contributes to the overall stress level. This is important when 
considering the positive and negative representation used in the Likert Scale mentioned 
earlier. In other words, any influence, whether positive or negative, affects an individual’s 
risk level for causing insider damage. For purposes of this research, influences similar to 
the events used in the Life Stress Test are used, each cross-referenced against the others 
for effect using the Likert scale, resulting in a matrix of human influences. The model 
also includes a similar matrix of events, in keeping with the Life Stress Test, used in 
conjunction with the influence matrix to generate scores representing an employees 
potential for causing insider damage.   
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3.2  Formal Description 
 This section provides a formal description of the Risk Predictor Model, including 
variable definitions and formulae the RPM uses to produce the outputs. Note, m 
represents the number of influences, n represents the number of events, and x represents 
the current iteration through the model. 
3.2.1  RPM Variable Definitions. 
Inputs 
 I = Influence Matrix     m x m 
 E = Event Matrix     n x m 
 Rx = Response Vector (either Initial or Current) 1 x m 
 Sx = Stimulus Vector (either Initial or standard) 1 x n 
Interim variables 
 xx = Interim Response Vector    1 x m 
 yx = Interim Stimulus Vector    1 x m 
 zx = Interim Stimulus Response Vector  1 x m 
Outputs  
 Rx+1 = new Current Response Vector   1 x m 
 Initial Scorex = numerical representation of the employees’ initial risk 
 Current Scorex+1 = numerical representation of the employees’ current risk 
 time_y = time period of interest 
 Slopetime_y = slope of scores versus time period of interest 
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3.2.2  Formulae – In Step-by-Step Order. 
time_y
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3.3  Risk Predictor Model 
Given the foundation for the Risk Predictor Model, and its formal definition, it is 
now possible to cover specifics about the model, such as its inputs and outputs and what 
the model actually does. The next few sections look into each aspect of the model in 
detail, while Chapter IV is reserved for testing the model. The RPM takes four separate 
inputs: the influence matrix, the event matrix, the response vector, and the stimulus 
vector. Each is described below: 
3.4  The Influence Matrix  
The influence matrix contains all the influences an organization considers 
pertinent to its operation. The organization must decide which influences are important 
and how the influences affect each other. For example, having a Secret or Top Secret 
security clearance is certainly an influence to include in the DoD influence matrix, but is 
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probably not a concern for a department store. Similarly, an airline company’s interest in 
the influence of noise on its employees differs from the city library’s interest. Once an 
organization decides which influences are important, they are added to the matrix by 
listing them in a column on the left and again in a row across the top (Figure 14 below). 
Although the number of influences in this example is small, Figure 14 shows an influence 
matrix where the organization has selected six influences of concern. The next step is to 
cross-reference each influence in the first column against each of the influences in the top 
row. As before, this is organization specific since each organization feels differently 
about how one influence affects another. For example, a coffee house treats the influence 
caffeine has over a medical condition differently physician’s office treats it. So, the 
organization takes the desired influences, determines how each affects the others, and 
completes the matrix.  
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Figure 14.  Example of Influence Matrix 
 
 
 
 34 
3.4.1  Scoring 
There are a few important details to note about scoring in the RPM. First, a higher 
overall score equates to higher overall risk. As a result, a -2 lowers the overall score and a 
2 raises the score (actually, it is more likely that a -2 simply raises the overall score by 
less than a 2 does). For example, stress has a negative effect on the relationship with 
family, which is represented by a positive 2, because the implication is that the score 
(risk) goes up because of the negative influence of stress. Likewise, a pay raise at work 
positively effects family financial stability, but is represented by a -2, resulting in a lower 
overall score (risk) based on the positive influence of additional pay.  
Second, the model is only as good as its inputs, which are derived by the 
organization. As a result, it is critical that a subject matter expert (or team of them) within 
the organization is the individual which determines which influences (and later events) 
are used to build the matrices used for the model inputs. Furthermore, because the model 
deals with human influences, it is equally important that the individual (or team) that 
scores how each influence (or event) affects the others in the matrix is not only a subject 
mater expert, but also has human behavior experience. This ensures that the model is 
properly populated with pertinent organization information as well as relevant human 
behavior data.  
Third, it is important to realize that the relationship between two influences (or 
event and influence) is not necessarily reciprocal. For example, a pay raise has a positive 
effect on the family financial situation, but the reverse is not true; family financial 
situation has no bearing on receiving a pay raise.  
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Fourth, to avoid circular feedback where the result is a spiraling score with no 
limit, the RPM does not consider the affects of an influence over itself. For example, 
having a certain level of stress is, by itself, stressful. If an organization were to evaluate 
the affect stress has over stress, the resulting value spirals out of control as stress begets 
more stress, which begets more stress, etc.  
3.4.2  Influence Matrix Revisited 
Now that matrix scoring is established, it is helpful to look at a small example of 
populating an influence matrix, or similarly, an event matrix (Figure 15). This figure 
illustrates an example where the organization has chosen stress, pay cut, relationship with 
family, and family financial status as the applicable influences. 
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Stress 0
Pay Cut 0
Relationship with Family 0
Family Financial Status 0
 
Figure 15.  Populating an Influence Matrix, part 1 
 
Notice that the diagonal elements in the matrix that correspond to influences 
cross-referenced with themselves are filled with zeros, to avoid feedback. Next, the 
subject matter expert completes the matrix by examining the influence in each row and 
determining how it affects each of the influences in the columns. Essentially, they take 
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the first influence, stress, and determine how they believe stress affects a pay cut, the 
relationship with family and the family financial status influences. For example, they 
decide that stress negatively effects the relationship with family (and receives a 1), but 
has no effect on receiving a pay cut or the current family financial situation (both receive 
0s). Additionally, a pay cut negatively effects stress, relationship with family, and family 
financial situation (all three receiving 1s). This process continues until the entire matrix is 
populated (Figure 16). Notice how the relationship between stress and family financial 
status differs from the relationship between family financial status and stress.  
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Stress 0 0 1 0
Pay Cut 1 0 1 1
Relationship with Family 1 0 0 0
Family Financial Status 1 0 1 0
 
Figure 16.  Populating an Influence Matrix, part 2 
 
Lastly, once created, the matrix is static for purposes of the model. Although the 
organization has the ability to change the matrices (influence or event) at any time, the 
RPM has no capability to change the matrices, hence they are considered static. 
3.5  The Event Matrix 
The event matrix is formed exactly like the influence matrix. It is similarly 
organization specific, where a subject matter expert within the organization decides 
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which events are important and how they affect the influences used in the influence 
matrix. It is here that it becomes increasingly clear that cross-referenced relationships are 
not reciprocal. In the case of the event matrix, the chosen events are listed in the first 
column and the exact same influences used in the influence matrix are listed in the row 
across the top (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.  Example Event Matrix 
 
There are two major differences between the event matrix and the influence 
matrix. First, the event matrix is not always square. Figure 17 above illustrates this, as 
there are four events and six influences. The number of events varies (more than, equal to 
or less than the number of influences), but the influences used must exactly match the 
ones used in the influence matrix in number, name and location in the matrix. Secondly, 
because of the first difference, there are no possibilities for circular relationships and 
therefore every event is evaluated against every influence. 
Aside from these differences, population of the event matrix is performed in the 
same manner as the influence matrix (see Section 3.4.2 above) and is likewise static, once 
created (Figure 18). In this example, Event A increases stress and negatively affects the 
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employee’s relationship with family, Event B increases stress and negatively affects the 
employee’s family financial status and Event C significantly increases stress while 
negatively affecting both the employee’s relationship with family and family financial 
status. 
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Event A 1 0 1 0
Event B 1 0 0 1
Event C 2 0 1 1
 
Figure 18.  Example of a Populated Event Matrix 
 
3.6  Response Vector 
The third input to the RPM is the employee’s Response Vector. The Response 
Vector is a one-dimensional (hence a vector and not a matrix) input that consists of a list 
of influences and a number (between -2 and 2) representing the level of effect each has 
over the particular employee (Figure 19). Each employee has one, and it is important that 
the list of influences in the Response Vector exactly match the influences used in the 
influence matrix in number, name, and ordering within the matrix. 
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Stress 2
Pay Raise 0
Relationship with Family 1
Family Financial Status 0
 
Figure 19.  Sample Response Vector for Employee John Smith 
 
In this example, employee John Smith suffers from a heavy stress level, is 
uninfluenced by a pay cut or family financial status, and has some strain in his 
relationship with his family. Note the same Likert Scaling is used and the influences used 
are identical to the ones used in the previous example (see Section 3.4.2 above). 
Described below are three different types of Response Vectors, all having the exact same 
form, with slightly varying function. 
3.6.1  Initial Response Vector 
The Initial Response Vector is the initial vector that represents the influences over 
an employee at the beginning, whether it is at job inception, upon implementation of the 
RPM by security personnel, simply the results of a survey, or some amalgamation of the 
three. Organizations determine the exact method for attaining these Initial Response 
Vectors and recognize the fact that accurately establishing a baseline of the influences 
that affect their employees is a difficult one. At initial employment, not much is known 
about an employee, but diligent review of past work experience and references usually 
sheds some light on employees. A security clearance goes a long way towards starting an 
Initial Response Vector. Conversely, employee surveys are problematic because 
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individuals tend to inaccurately evaluate the severity or even existence of influences over 
themselves. One way to help generate Initial Response Vectors is through supervisor 
involvement. There is no substitute for good supervisor involvement, because supervisors 
know their employees better than anyone in the organization does. Whether a survey is 
administered, or a supervisor makes an informed opinion based on careful observation 
and interaction with the employee, it is crucial that an Initial Response Vector is created 
for every employee. The Initial Response Vector is used only once, as an input to the 
RPM to determine each employee’s initial score. 
3.6.2  Interim Response Vector 
The second type Response Vector is the Interim Response Vector. This vector is 
only the result of an intermediate step in the RPM mathematics. It is referred to later in 
this chapter, but serves no other purpose outside the model mathematics. 
3.6.3  Current Response Vector 
The last type of Response Vector is the Current Response Vector, which is the 
standard Response Vector. This vector is identical in all respects to the Initial Response 
Vector except for the updated influence values in the vector. It is actually an output of the 
model, which then serves as the next Response Vector input to the RMP when another 
stimulus is introduced. So, the first time the model is used on an employee, it takes the 
Initial Response Vector as one of the inputs, produces an Interim Response Vector during 
an intermediary math step, which is used during the final mathematics calculations to 
produce one of the outputs, the Current Response Vector. Then, each time a new iteration 
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of the model is needed, the Current Response Vector is used as the input in place of the 
Initial Response Vector.    
3.7  Stimulus Vector 
The fourth and final input to the RPM is the Stimulus Vector. Like the Response 
Vector, it is a one-dimensional (hence a vector and not a matrix) input that consists of a 
list of all events found in the Event Matrix evaluated with a zero or one (Figure 20). 
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Event A 0
Event B 1
Event C 0
 
Figure 20.  Sample Stimulus Vector for Employee John Smith 
 
 The Stimulus Vector is used to “turn on” events as they occur during an 
employee’s career and, like the Response Vector, it is crucial that the list of events in the 
Stimulus Vector exactly match the events used in the event matrix in number, name and 
ordering within the matrix. The Stimulus Vector is a list of all possible events with a “1” 
representing an event that has occurred and a “0” representing events that have not 
occurred. In this example, only Event B has occurred. The model accepts multiple events 
in the Stimulus Vector, but traditionally, each time an event occurs, the Stimulus Vector 
is reset and updated accordingly, before being input into the RPM. Like the Response 
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Vector, there are several types of Stimulus Vectors, all having the same form, differing 
only in function. 
3.7.1  Initial Stimulus Vector 
The Initial Stimulus Vector is used during the first calculations made by the RPM, 
prior to any events being applied to the employee, in order to calculate the employee’s 
initial score (see Outputs in Section 3.9 below). It is simply a Stimulus Vector with all 
events “turned off”, shown with zero values. 
3.7.2  Interim Stimulus Vector 
Like the Interim Response Vector, the Interim Stimulus Vector is only the result 
of an intermediate step in the RPM mathematics. It is important to note that due to the 
mathematics explained in Section 3.8 below, the Interim Stimulus Vector is actually the 
length of the number of influences, not the number of events. It is referred to later in this 
chapter, but serves no purpose outside the model mathematics. 
3.7.3  Interim Stimulus Response Vector 
Like the other interim vectors, the Interim Stimulus Response Vector is a 
temporary vector created during the model mathematics. It is actually the sum of the 
Interim Response Vector and the Interim Stimulus Vector, which makes it the length of 
the number of influences, not the number of events. It is referred to later in this chapter, 
but serves no purpose outside the model mathematics. 
3.7.4  Standard Stimulus Vector 
The fourth and final type is the standard Stimulus Vector or just Stimulus Vector. 
It is used each time an event occurs during an employee’s career by “turning on” the 
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event by setting it to a 1 in the vector. It is used in all RPM calculations except for 
determining initial employee scores, when the Initial Stimulus Vector is used. 
3.8  Interaction of the Inputs 
 Now that each of the inputs is defined, both in use and shape (matrix or vector), it 
is necessary to determine how these inputs interact. The formal description of the model 
was given in Section 3.2 above. The section defined the way the RPM uses the inputs to 
produce outputs, for example, multiply the Response Vector by the Influence Matrix or 
add the Interim Stimulus Vector to the Interim Response Vector. This is the step-by-step 
process of using the inputs mathematically to yield a usable output that mitigates insider 
threat, the primary goal of this research. These operations are accomplished using basic 
matrix mathematics. 
3.8.1  Notes on Matrix Representation. 
It is important to note, that for purposes of display appealing to the human eye, the 
Response and Stimulus Vectors have been transposed and displayed in multi-row, single 
column or m x 1 format (see Figures 19 and 20 above). This is how one expects to look at 
a list of influences or events and whether or not they apply to an employee. However, for 
mathematical reasons, they are represented as 1 x m and 1 x n vectors, respectively.  
It is also important to understand that maintaining the quantity, order and naming 
of the text portion of the matrices and vectors is necessary to perform the operations only 
on the numerical portion of the input matrices and vectors. In other words, the 
mathematics involved only works on the numerical data (initial values between -2 and 2) 
contained within the matrices and vectors, and the data becomes useless if the text portion 
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(the lists of influences or events) of the matrices and vectors is not rigidly maintained. 
With that in mind, the next section describes the steps the RPM performs, using the 
following notation: m represents the number of influences and n represents the number of 
events. Therefore, the influence matrix is m x m, the response vector is 1 x m, the event 
matrix is n x m and the stimulus vector is 1 x n. 
3.8.2  Description of the Risk Predictor Model Mathematics 
First, multiply the Current Response Vector (or during the first calculation, the 
Initial Response Vector) by the Influence Matrix, yielding the Interim Response Vector. 
This is represented as 1 x m * m x m which yields a 1 x m vector, and effectively 
computes the effect the influences over the employee actually have on the employee. In 
other words, the Response Vector identifies which influences affect the employee, but not 
how they affect each other as defined by the influence matrix. The Interim Response 
Vector holds this information. To continue the example from before, Figures 16, 18, 19, 
and 20 represent the inputs to the RPM. This step produces the mathematics in Equation 
1, resulting in the Interim Response Vector on the right. 
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Next, multiply the Stimulus Vector (or during the first calculation, the Initial 
Stimulus Vector) by the Event Matrix yielding the Interim Stimulus Vector. This is 
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represented as 1 x n * n x m which yields a 1 x m vector, and effectively determines the 
new influences that affect the employee as a result of the event. That is the reason the 
Interim Stimulus Vector is equal in length to the response vector, as it holds data about 
influences, not events. These new influences are added to the existing influences that 
affect the employee to determine the total effect of the influences over an employee after 
the event has occurred. In the continuing example, this step produces the mathematics in 
Equation 2, resulting in the Interim Stimulus Vector on the right. 
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As a result, the model adds the interim stimulus vector to the interim response 
vector yielding the interim stimulus response vector. This is represented as 1 x m + 1 x m, 
which yields a 1 x m vector that effectively computes the magnitude that each influence 
has over the employee. However, as with the Response Vector, the interim stimulus 
response vector reflects which influences affect the employee, but not how they affect 
each other as defined by the influence matrix. Our example continues in Equation 3, with 
the Interim Stimulus Response Vector being the final result on the right. 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]423210013231 =+    (3) 
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In the final mathematical step, the model multiplies the interim stimulus response 
vector by the Influence Matrix to produce a new Current Response Vector. This is 1 x m * 
m x m which yields a 1 x m vector, and effectively computes the effect of all influences 
(including influences raised by the event) over the employee, to include influence matrix 
affects. In the example, Equation 3 is multiplied by the Influence Matrix (Figure 16), with 
the new Current Response Vector being the final result on the right (Equation 4). 
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3.9  Outputs 
The RPM produces four outputs: the Current Response Vector, the Current Score 
(also the initial score as a result of the first iteration with no stimulus), a linear regression, 
and the change in scores versus time. Each is described below: 
3.9.1  Current Response Vector. 
Transposing the new Current Response Vector from Equation 4 yields an m x 1 
vector, which represents a list of all the influences that currently affect the employee and 
to what magnitude (Figure 21). In the situation where another event occurs, this vector is 
fed back into the RPM as the Response Vector input. Note that in John Smith’s Initial 
Response Vector (see Figure 19 above), he had no influence from family financial status, 
but now does because Event B has added the influence. Although produced as an output 
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of the RPM, it is more valuable as a new input to the next iteration of the RPM, and is not 
considered an output for purposes of the model test in Chapter IV.  
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Stress 10
Pay Raise 0
Relationship with Family 9
Family Financial Status 3
 
Figure 21.  Response Vector for Employee John Smith AFTER Event B has Occurred 
 
3.9.2  Current Score. 
The Current Response Vector presents the important ability to track the current 
state of influences over an employee. It serves as a snapshot of the employee’s current 
situation, but is also the fundamental method of continued monitoring of an employee by 
returning it to the RPM during the next iteration performed on another event. However, 
the vector is still a list of influences and every employee has a different list with different 
magnitudes. In order to better predict the risk an employee poses to the organization, 
another metric is needed. The sum of the elements of the Current Response Vector yields 
a Current Score (Figure 22), or in the case of the first iteration, the Initial Score. This 
score is used to compare employees to each other or more importantly, against an 
organization’s established norm.  
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Stress 10
Pay Raise 0
Relationship with Family 9
Family Financial Status 3
Current Score 22
 
Figure 22.  Current Score for Employee John Smith (Sum of Response Vector) 
 
There are numerous ways for an organization to use the Current Score, but just 
like choosing the influences and events to use in the RPM and populating the Influence 
and Event Matrices, the method of analysis is left to each organization. While some 
organizations set thresholds, others establish scores representing the norm and look for 
scores that greatly deviate from the norm, and still others look at the amount of change 
over time as an indicator of risk. 
 3.9.3  Linear Regression (Trend Lines). 
The third output available from the RPM is a linear regression of the scores. 
“Linear regression is a mathematical process that determines the best linear fit through a 
set of data points.” [21] “Linear regression is widely used in biological and behavioral 
sciences to describe relationships between variables. It ranks as one of the most important 
tools used in these disciplines.” [22] By taking the linear regression of a set of scores, the 
organization establishes trends, comparable to slopes, on each of their employees. As 
before, it is left to the organization to determine how to use the information, but 
establishing a baseline regression, and then looking for large degrees or angles of 
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separation between employees’ regressions and the baseline regression is a good example 
(see Chapter IV). Other options are setting a threshold slope and looking for slopes that 
exceed the threshold, or establishing a “normal” slope and looking for slopes that 
significantly deviate from “normal”. These are indicators of heightened risk that security 
personnel use to stop insider damage before it occurs. Another way to look at the slopes 
or regression is to watch employees’ regression lines grow over time and pay close 
attention to the ones that grow faster than normal. The example used so far in this chapter 
has only inserted one event, and although enough to show a slope, Chapter IV provides a 
much better example of this capability. 
3.9.4  Change in Scores Versus Time. 
The final output of the RPM is useful to organizations interested in the amount of 
Change in Scores Versus Time. By plotting scores over certain time periods, 
organizations observe the periods of heightened activity, which, like scores, are used in 
any number of ways and is left to the organization to decide how to make them useful. 
Examples are interest in seeing the change in scores over a three-year window or 
watching the change quarterly.  
Another significance of the Change in Scores Versus Time metric is that 
organizations choose the time period of interest. By setting the time period small enough, 
changes in score for each event in an employee’s history are seen, conversely by selecting 
a longer the time period, the change in score by quarter, year, or assignment are available 
which provide organizations with a bigger picture of employee risk. Again, the example 
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used in this chapter has only produced two scores (one change), but a more interesting 
example is provided in Chapter IV. 
3.10  Summary 
This chapter presented the concepts behind the Risk Predictor Model, starting 
with a firm modeling foundation, continuing with a formal description of the model and 
mathematics involved, and finishing with in-depth details about the model itself, both in 
what it does and how it does it. The model as described is intended to identify employees 
with a higher risk of performing insider damage against an organization. It is in no way an 
“insider detector”, but rather a security tool that identifies another indicator, in this case 
risk, which assists in mitigating insider threat. However, before the model is 
implemented, it is necessary to verify that it does what is intended. Chapter IV provides 
an in-depth case study as well as rigorous testing necessary to exercise the model 
properly. 
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IV.  Application and Case Study 
 
 Chapter III gave a detailed description of the Risk Predictor Model, from model 
inception to usefulness of it outputs. The example presented throughout the chapter was 
sufficient to illustrate the steps involved in creating the model, but was too limited to 
serve as a full operations check of the model. This chapter describes the method of testing 
the model, including how it is populated as well as tested using a detailed case study. 
Also included, is a thorough account of the model outputs following the test. 
4.1  Adjudicative Guidelines 
Now that the model design is complete, it is necessary to populate and test it. For 
purposes of testing the model in this research, the static Influence and Event matrices in 
the model are populated using the Thirteen Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (Figure 23).  
 
(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;
(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign influence;
(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign preference;
(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual behavior;
(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal conduct;
(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial considerations;
(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol consumption;
(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug involvement;
(9) GUIDELINE  I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal conduct;
(11) GUIDELINE K: Security violations;
(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside activities;
(13) GUIDELINE M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems
 
 
Figure 23.  Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access To Classified 
Information [23] 
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In 1997, these guidelines were approved by the President of the United States for 
use by “all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, 
employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees 
and other individuals who require access to classified information” and for “initial or 
continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive 
compartmented information and special access programs, and are to be used by 
government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.” [23] Below 
is a short description of each guideline. 
4.1.1  Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States. 
Key words – “Individuals must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United 
States…or the safety of classified information is in doubt.” [23] 
4.1.2  Guideline B: Foreign Influence. 
Key words – A security risk from potential foreign influence exists when an 
individual's immediate family or someone he or she is bound by influence are not citizens 
of the United States, which potentially results in the compromise of classified 
information. “Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other 
countries…make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or 
pressure.” [23] 
4.1.3  Guideline C: Foreign Preference. 
Key words – “When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference 
for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she is prone to provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.” [23] 
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4.1.4  Guideline D: Sexual Behavior. 
Key words – “Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal 
offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder…or reflects lack of judgment or 
discretion.” [23] 
4.1.5  Guideline E: Personal Conduct. 
Key words – “Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could 
indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information.” [23] 
4.1.6  Guideline F: Financial Considerations. 
Key words – “An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having 
to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to 
proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.” [23] 
4.1.7  Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption. 
Key words – “Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of 
questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.” [23] 
4.1.8  Guideline H: Drug Involvement. 
Key words – “Illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an 
individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or 
dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.” [23] 
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4.1.9  Guideline I: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders. 
Key words – Mental Health “disorders can cause a significant deficit in an 
individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning…[which] may indicate a 
defect in judgment, reliability or stability.” [23] 
4.1.10  Guideline J: Criminal Conduct. 
Key words – “A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a 
person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.” [23] 
4.1.11  Guideline K: Security Violations. 
Key words – “Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about [a 
person’s] trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.” 
[23] 
4.1.12  Guideline L: Outside Activities. 
Key words – “Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is 
of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and 
could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.” [23] 
4.1.13  Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems. 
Key words – “Noncompliance with…regulations pertaining to information 
technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's 
trustworthiness…and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and 
information.” [23] 
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4.1.14  Adjudicative Process. 
“The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's 
life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting 
these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a 
number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information 
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in 
reaching a determination.” [23] 
4.2  Populating the Model 
As discussed during model development (Chapter III), the actual influences and 
events used in the model are organization specific and populated by an organization 
expert, someone familiar with the organization’s wants and needs. The Adjudicative 
Guidelines are used by all government agencies to grant security clearances and for this 
reason, the model is populated with influences and events that stem from the guidelines. 
Thus, as the model tracks employees throughout their careers, it is as if they are 
constantly being checked against the guidelines that granted them clearance in the first 
place.  
4.2.1  Influences and Descriptions. 
The Sample Influence Matrix is populated with thirty influences based on the 
Adjudicative Guidelines (Figure 24). Each guideline is represented at least once and some 
are represented more than once. Guidelines E and F are represented several times each 
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because they signify events that are most common and observable in employees’ 
behavior.  
 
Influence Guideline
Stress I
Have Criminal record J
Self Esteem I
Use of legal substances (Caffeine, Nicotine, Social drinking) G
Use of Narcotics/Addictions (alcoholism, gambling) H
S/TS clearance K
High profile job F
Satisfaction with company/organization F
Expectations for advancements (promotion/pay raise) F
Job security/stability F
Workload, quantity/ability to meet deadlines F
Amount of and ability to deal with complex technology M
Experience required for job F
Community involvement L
Relationship with family B
Social commitments (relationship w/friends or foreign influence) B
Involved in illicit/illegal relationships D
Religious practices L
Satisfaction with salary F
Family financial stability/security (debt, savings, retirement, etc.) F
Relationship with Co-workers E
Desire to cover for inadequacies E
Greed F
Feeling of invincibility - can't get caught E
Name recognition (narcissism) E
Experienced rejection I
Opportunity (lack of Organized Defense) E
Satisfaction with country/politics (patriotism) A
State of the Economy F
Concern for world condition (foreign preference) C
 
Figure 24.  Influences Used in the Sample Influence Matrix 
 
The influences chosen have general names to make them wieldy in the matrices 
and vectors, but require short definitions to help categorize various influences in 
employee’s lives. Each organization not only chooses the influences it wants to use and 
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the degrees to which they affect each other, but also defines each influence so they are 
clearly distinct from one other. The influences used in this test of the RPM are defined as 
follows, with low (or positive) amount of influence being represented by -2 on the Likert 
Scale and high (or negative) amount of influence represented by 2 on the Likert Scale. 
Additionally, each influence is considered to affect the employee if someone observes it 
and reports it to the organization or the employee admits to it. 
Stress refers to any external stimulus that causes a physiological response in the 
employee. Have Criminal Record refers to the effects of current or past criminal activities 
in the employee’s life, for example, a past mistake is forgotten by the employee, but not 
necessarily by disgruntled accomplices. Self Esteem refers to the current level of self-
esteem the employee displays. Use of Legal Substances such as caffeine, nicotine, or 
social drinking refers to the number of and amount of legal substances the employee uses. 
Use of Narcotics or Addictions such as alcoholism or gambling refers to the number of 
and amount of illegal substances the employee uses.  
Secret or Top Secret Clearance refers to the current level of clearance the 
employee has. High Profile Job refers to the type of position the employee holds within 
the organization, such as political office, high rank official, or coveted job in public 
service such as police officer, fire fighter, or FBI agent. Satisfaction with Organization 
refers to the employee’s apparent happiness with the organization as a whole. 
Expectations for Advancements refers to the employee’s satisfaction with expectation for 
promotion or pay raises within the organization. Job Security refers to climate within the 
organization regarding the stability of each employee’s position.  
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Workload or Ability to Meet Deadlines refers to the amount of work the employee 
has, whether deadlines are reasonable, and whether the employee has the ability and 
appropriate materials available to meet deadlines. Amount of and Ability to Deal with 
Complex Technology refers to the amount of complex technology within the organization, 
the employees’ ability to use it, the training offered by the organization and the conditions 
for employees unable to adjust to the complex technologies. Experience Required for the 
Job refers to the amount of experience required for the job, the employee’s level of 
experience and its correlation to the experience needed for the job. Community 
Involvement refers to the opportunity (time) for and the employee’s satisfaction with 
involvement in the employee’s community. Relationship with Family refers to the time 
for and quality of the employee’s relationship with family.  
Social Commitments refers opportunity (time) for and the employee’s satisfaction 
with social commitments to include relationships wit friends or foreign influences. 
Involved in Illicit or Illegal Relationships refers to the employee’s involvement in 
relationships with extramarital partners, prostitution, or other characters who partake in 
illegal activities such as drug dealers. Religious Practices refers to the level of influence 
religious faith holds over the employee. Satisfaction with Salary refers to the employee’s 
satisfaction with his or her salary and belief that he or she is being paid fairly. Family 
Financial Security refers to the employee’s apparent satisfaction with his or her income, 
debt, savings, insurance, and retirement plan.  
Relationship with Co-workers refers to how the employee gets along with co-
workers, subordinates and supervisors, as well as how they get along with the employee 
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and whether the employee is a loner. Desire to Cover for Inadequacies refers to the 
employee’s need to cover up any inadequacy, self imposed or otherwise. Greed refers the 
employee’s need to build financial wealth and to what lengths the employee goes to 
achieve such wealth. Feeling of Invincibility refers to the employee’s apparent belief that 
he or she cannot or will not get caught doing something unauthorized. Name Recognition 
or Narcissism refers to the degree the employee wished to make a name for himself or 
herself and to what ends the employee goes to achieve such recognition.  
Experienced Rejection refers to the number of times, the severity of, and the 
employee’s perceived ability to handle rejection, whether it is from employers, potential 
mates, etc. Opportunity refers to the employee’s perceived opportunity to cause damage 
due to known lack of organized defense within the organization. Satisfaction with 
Country and Politics refers to the employee’s commitment to the US, perceived 
happiness with politics (party in office) and overall patriotism towards the US. State of 
the Economy refers to the employee’s current satisfaction with the state of the economy 
and expectations that such state has a negative impact on the employee (e.g., high gas 
prices). Concern for World Condition refers to the employee’s predilection for foreign 
preference or the degree to which the employee values the opinions of foreign nations, 
especially with respect to American foreign policy. 
4.2.2  Influence Matrix. 
Next, the influences are entered into the influence matrix where each influence is 
systematically analyzed against each of the other influences to determine its effect on 
them. Again, as discussed during model development, this process is accomplished by a 
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subject matter expert, preferably someone with human behavior experience. Patrick B. 
McGrath, Ph.D., is the Clinical Manager of Anxiety Services at Linden Oaks Hospital at 
Edward. Dr. McGrath is a clinical psychologist and holds a Bachelor’s Degree in 
Psychology from Illinois Wesleyan University, a Master's Degree in Clinical Psychology 
from Mississippi State University, and a Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology from 
Northern Illinois University. Further, he completed a two-year Postdoctoral Fellowship 
through the St. Louis University School of Medicine at the St. Louis Behavioral Medicine 
Institute. Dr. McGrath served as subject matter expert for purposes of this research [24], 
and with his help, each of the 900 cells in the influence matrix was analyzed to produce 
the populated influence matrix shown in Appendix A. 
4.2.3  Events and Descriptions. 
The Sample Event Matrix is populated with twenty-seven events, also based on 
the Adjudicative Guidelines (Figure 25 below).  
Like the influences above, the events chosen also have general names, but require 
definitions to help categorize occurrences in employee’s lives into the correct event name. 
They are defined below.  
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Event Guidelines
Alarming Statement B, C, D, E
Reported insider transgression K, M
Action out of Character E, I
Salary anomaly F
Excessive Interest B, C
Scrupulosity (Religious Fanaticism) A, E, I
Personality Quirk I
Unexplained affluence F
Legal Activity (Minor) D, E, J
Legal Activity (Moderate) D, E, J
Legal Activity (Major) D, E, J
Reprimanded D, E, J
Increased Absenteeism/Tardiness E
Change in Mental Health (positive) I
Change in Mental Health (negative) I
Change in Physical Health (positive) I
Change in Physical Health (negative) I
Change in work environment (positive) E, F, J
Change in work environment (negative) E, F, J
Recently fired D, E, J
Recently retired/quit F, I
Catastrophic event F, I
Change in family status (positive) B, F
Change in family status (negative) B, F
Financial impact F
Foreign interaction B, C
Hostile environment A, B, C
 
Figure 25.  Events Used in the Sample Event Matrix and Stimulus Vector 
 
An Alarming Statement is a public statement made by an employee or about an 
employee that indicated a potential security risk to those that heard it. A Reported Insider 
Transgression occurs when an employee is reported, through word of mouth or through 
official channels, to have caused actual insider damage. An Action out of Character 
occurs when an employee is witnessed acting out his/her normal behavior range. A Salary 
Anomaly occurs when an employee has experienced an oddity with respect to their current 
employment and their wages/benefits, such as salary not commiserate with job or 
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workload. Excessive Interest occurs when an employee is witnessed showing an odd 
amount of interest in a subject not normally within their sphere of interest, such as “need 
to know” violations.  
Scrupulosity, or religious fanaticism, occurs when an employee is witnessed 
showing or having extreme religious beliefs, such as occultism. A Personality Quirk 
occurs when an employee is witnessed having or showing abnormal behavior. 
Unexplained Affluence occurs when an employee is witnessed showing or having excess 
resources with respect to their economic status or class, such as having excessive cash or 
buying expensive items on a limited salary. Minor Legal Activity occurs when an 
employee experiences minor legal actions such as traffic tickets or small claims court. 
Moderate Legal Activity occurs when an employee experiences moderate legal actions 
such as misdemeanors, lawsuits, divorce proceedings, or child custody suits. Major Legal 
Activity occurs when an employee experiences major legal actions such as felonies or 
court martial proceedings.  
Reprimanded occurs when an employee receives punishment for an infraction at 
work to include leave without pay or suspension. Increased Absenteeism/Tardiness 
occurs when an employee is witnessed skipping work, calling in sick or coming in late 
more frequently than usual. Change in Mental Health occurs when an employee is has a 
change in mental health such as increased irritability, depression, anxiety, panic attacks or 
losing touch with reality (negative) or shows recovery from mental illness (positive). 
Change in Physical Health occurs when an employee has a change in physical health 
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such as injury, sickness, increased fatigue, or frequent visits to the doctor (negative) or 
shows a recovery from physical maladies (positive).  
Change in Work Environment occurs when an employee experiences a change in 
employer, supervisor, job location, job title, position (promotion), pay scale (raise) or 
rank (positive) or a change in employer, supervisor, job location, job title, rank, position 
(demotion), pay scale (pay cut), or is the victim or perpetrator of sexual harassment or 
racism (negative). Recently Fired occurs when an employee has recently involuntarily left 
the organization such as being let go, fired, downsized, involuntary separated or 
dishonorably discharged. Recently Retired or Quit occurs when an employee has recently 
voluntarily left the organization. A Catastrophic Event occurs when an employee 
experiences terrorism, natural disaster such as fire, flood, earthquake, tornado, or 
hurricane, man-made disaster such as criminal activity, including arson, murder, 
kidnapping, rape, assault, theft, or personal loss such as loss of home.  
A Change in Family Status (also includes close friends) occurs when an employee 
experiences a gain of family member, to include pregnancy or a change in relationship 
status such as marriage or marital reconciliation (positive) or the loss of family member, 
to include loss of pregnancy or a change in relationship status such as divorce or 
separation (negative). Financial impact occurs when an employee experiences a large 
financial change such as bankruptcy or a large purchase such as car, home, or boat. 
Foreign Interaction occurs when an employee is deployed, attached, assigned, or 
vacationing to a foreign location. Hostile Environment occurs when an employee is 
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inserted into a hostile, dangerous, or life-threatening environment, experiences combat, 
reunion stress, battle fatigue, or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.   
4.2.4  Event Matrix. 
Next, the events are entered into the event matrix where each event is 
systematically analyzed against each of the influences (from the influence matrix) to 
determine its effect on the influences. As before, this process is accomplished by a 
subject matter expert, and Dr. McGrath helped analyze each of the 810 cells in the event 
matrix [24], producing the resulting populated event matrix shown in Appendix B. 
4.2.5  Initial Stimulus Vector. 
The Initial Stimulus Vector contains all zeros, as the initial employee evaluation 
occurs with no events. Figure 26 below represents the Initial Stimulus Vector used during 
the testing of the model. 
4.2.6  Response Vectors. 
The last model input populated before testing is the Response Vector. However, before 
the model differentiates between a normal employee and a malicious one, it is first 
necessary to consider the employee used to represent “normal”. The employee is subject 
to the same influence and event matrices as well as the initial stimulus vector. The exact 
nature of the normal employee is also left to the organization and its experts on the 
subject, as different organizations have vastly different ideas of normal. For some 
organizations, comparing all of their employees by using the model to generate an 
average is considered “normal”. Other organizations with specific needs precisely pick 
what they wish to consider normal. For purposes of this research, normal is being defined 
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as a “typical employee” who has initial responses and career events defined in the next 
sections. 
 
Event Stimulus Vector
Alarming Statement 0
Reported insider transgression 0
Action out of Character 0
Salary anomaly 0
Excessive Interest 0
Scrupulosity (Religious Fanaticism) 0
Personality Quirk 0
Unexplained affluence 0
Legal Activity (Minor) 0
Legal Activity (Moderate) 0
Legal Activity (Major) 0
Reprimanded 0
Increased Absenteeism/Tardiness 0
Change in Mental Health (positive) 0
Change in Mental Health (negative) 0
Change in Physical Health (positive) 0
Change in Physical Health (negative) 0
Change in work environment (positive) 0
Change in work environment (negative) 0
Recently fired 0
Recently retired/quit 0
Catastrophic event 0
Change in family status (positive) 0
Change in family status (negative) 0
Financial impact 0
Foreign interaction 0
Hostile environment 0
 
Figure 26.  Initial Stimulus Vector 
 
4.2.7  Typical Employee’s Initial Response Vector. 
The Typical Employee’s Initial Response Vector used here shows the employee at 
career inception (Figure 27). The employee exhibits a moderate level of stress, has just 
received a Secret security clearance, and is optimistic about the organization, expectations 
for advancement and job security. Being new to the organization and young, the 
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employee is somewhat dissatisfied with salary, family financial stability, and the current 
state of the economy. On the other hand, the employee is patriotic and loyal to the United 
States. 
 
Influence
Response 
Vector
Stress 1
Have Criminal record 0
Self Esteem 0
Use of legal substances (Caffeine, Nicotine, Social drinking) 0
Use of Narcotics/Addictions (alcoholism, gambling) 0
S/TS clearance 1
High profile job 0
Satisfaction with company/organization -1
Expectations for advancements (promotion/pay raise) -1
Job security/stability -1
Workload, quantity/ability to meet deadlines 0
Amount of and ability to deal with complex technology 0
Experience required for job 0
Community involvement 0
Relationship with family 0
Social commitments (relationship w/friends or foreign influence) 0
Involved in illicit/illegal relationships 0
Religious practices 0
Satisfaction with salary 1
Family financial stability/security (debt, savings, retirement, etc.) 1
Relationship with Co-workers 0
Desire to cover for inadequacies 0
Greed 0
Feeling of invincibility - can't get caught 0
Name recognition (narcissism) 0
Experienced rejection 0
Opportunity (lack of Organized Defense) 0
Satisfaction with country/politics (patriotism) -1
State of the Economy 1
Concern for world condition (foreign preference) 0
 
Figure 27.  Typical Employee’s Initial Response Vector 
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4.2.8  Typical Employee’s Career Stimuli. 
Next, the Typical Employee’s Career Stimuli are generated. For purposes of this research, 
the employee is considered to have 13 years with a government organization (from 1993 
to present), has had several promotions and multiple assignments. Along the way, the 
employee has had several additions to the family and some short family separations due 
to work. In addition, there have been short periods of financial difficulty, as well as some 
minor legal action due to a traffic ticket and an automobile accident. Finally, in recent 
times, the employee has had some trouble with family and health. All total, there are 53 
stimuli from the employee’s 13-year career (Figure 28). Note, the Typical Employee’s 
Initial Score is shown in 1992, just prior the employee’s acceptance into the government 
organization. 
This is a reasonable representation of a typical employee. No one goes through 
life without obstacles and including several events near the end of the stimulus list helps 
test the ability of the model to differentiate between normal and malicious while still 
showing increased risk. Also, none of the 53 events has anything to do with malicious 
insider intent to cause damage.  
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Year Description Stimulus Year Description Stimulus
1993 Career Inception
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2001 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2001 Speeding ticket Legal Activity (minor)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2001 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993
Reunited with family 
after short separation
Change in Family 
(positive) 2002 Financial problems Financial Impact
1993 Financial problems Financial Impact 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Promotion
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1993 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1994
Reunited with family 
after short separation
Change in Family 
(positive) 2002 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1994 Child born
Change in Family 
(positive) 2002 Family trouble
Change in Family 
(negative)
1995 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Health Problem
Change in Mental Health 
(negative)
1995 Promotion
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2002 Health Problem resolved
Change in Mental Health 
(positive)
1996 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2003 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1996
Car Accident and 
lawsuit Legal Activity (minor) 2003 Family trouble
Change in Family 
(negative)
1997 Child born
Change in Family 
(positive) 2003 Health Problem
Change in Mental Health 
(negative)
1997 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2004 Promotion
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1998 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2004 Health Problem resolved
Change in Mental Health 
(positive)
1998 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2004 Family trouble resolved
Change in Family 
(positive)
1998 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2004 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1998 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2005 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1998 Assignment
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2005 Health problem
Change in physical health 
(negative)
1998 Promotion
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2005 Health Problem resolved
Change in physical health 
(positive)
1999 Pay Raise
Change in work 
environment (positive) 2005 Financial problems Financial Impact
1999 Child born
Change in Family 
(positive) 2006 Promotion
Change in work 
environment (positive)
2000 Financial problems Financial Impact
 
Figure 28.  Typical Employee’s Career Stimuli 
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4.3  Case Study 
Making up the typical employee for the model test is acceptable, primarily 
because each organization creates its own version of a typical employee to peg its 
employees against during operational use of the model. However, to test that the model 
can, in fact, differentiate between a normal employee and a malicious one, it is necessary 
to use a real perpetrator of insider damage. To test the model, a case study on Robert 
Phillip Hanssen, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) agent turned spy was 
performed. 
4.3.1  Why choose Robert Hanssen? 
There are several reasons for testing the RPM using the Hanssen case study for the 
malicious insider. For starters, he was caught in February 2001 after 25 years of selling 
secrets to the Soviet Union and Russia. This provides a long history of transgressions, 
which yields an ample supply of observable and recordable behaviors that are typical of 
malicious insiders. Second, his apprehension was purely accidental; the FBI had no clue 
what was going on until a Russian agent turned over boxes of FBI information that 
Hanssen had secretly turned over to his handlers during the previous 25 years. Even after 
receiving all the contraband, FBI operatives had no clue who the culprit was and claimed 
it could take years to find out; until they found Hanssen’s fingerprints on the plastic 
garbage bags he had wrapped his illegal packages in. This is significant because it gives 
the model an opportunity to flag Hanssen as a high risk for causing insider damage long 
before his accidental capture occurred. The model is not designed to only identify high-
risk employees, but also identify them early, thus reducing the amount of damage that 
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occurs. Finally, although Hanssen’s case is considered one of the most damaging cases of 
espionage in history, the fact that he led two separate lives is significant because it makes 
him just like all the other insiders that have caused damage. On the outside, he was a 
seemingly patriotic, deeply religious family man, but on the inside, he was a cold 
calculating spy, capable of giving the Soviets the names of three Russians (who were later 
executed or imprisoned) who were spying for the US. This makes even Hanssen’s high 
profile case, complete with accidental capture and extreme length of maliciousness, 
susceptible to anomaly detection. A person that lives two lives is going to make mistakes, 
and that is where the Risk Predictor Model comes in. 
4.3.2  Brief Historical View of Hanssen.  
It is important to begin with a brief history of Hanssen’s career with the FBI 
before creating his Initial Response Vector and career stimuli. Prior to establishing initial 
influences for Hanssen, it is necessary to get to know him in detail. Similarly, it is 
important to research the details of Hanssen’s life in order to properly assess which 
events in his life were observable and reportable, or were matters of public record, and 
which were not. For example, there were five separate incidents prior to Hanssen’s arrest 
where he was either directly implicated in causing insider damage or even admitted to it, 
however only three were reported, and none were taken seriously. It is suspected that in 
addition to his wife, several Catholic priests, a marriage counselor, a former colleague 
and a senior FBI field supervisor knew about or expressed concerns about Hanssen’s 
activities [25].  Unfortunately, the two instances that were not reported were not 
observables (to the FBI) and therefore were not considered for use in the testing of the 
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RPM. However, for completeness, the events are included in the short history of 
Hanssen’s FBI career that follows. Also note that unless specifically cited, all information 
regarding Hanssen came from Adrian Havill’s book, The Spy Who Stayed Out in the 
Cold: The Secret Life of FBI Double Agent Robert Hanssen [26]. 
4.3.3  The Early Years (1976-1978). 
Robert Phillip Hanssen was sworn into the FBI on January 12, 1976 on his second 
attempt to get in [27]. He was married to Bonnie Wauck (his wife of seven years) and 
already had two of his eventual six children, Jane and Susan, when he entered the FBI at 
age 31. After initial training in Indianapolis, he was assigned to the White Collar Crime 
Squad in Gary, Indiana. His first boy (3rd child), John was born in 1977 while he was 
assigned to Gary. 
4.3.4  Hanssen Crosses the Line (1979-1981). 
In August 1978, Hanssen was assigned to the FBI Field Office in New York [28], 
where his 4th child, Mark Edward, was born in 1980. During their three-year stay in New 
York, beginning in 1979, Hanssen offered several Russian agents secrets in exchange for 
money. In 1981, he was caught counting $20,000 in $100 bills by his wife. He boasted of 
his deals, but she made him promise to never do it again and go to a priest [27]. Hanssen 
did visit with Opus Dei priest, Robert P. Bucciarelli, who considered turning him in, but 
then thought it a breach of clerical ethics. Instead, he told Hanssen to give the cash to 
charity, which Hanssen did. 
The Hanssens were members of Opus Dei, a conservative and controversial 
Catholic organization with US roots in Chicago dating back to 1949. With only 84,000 
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members worldwide and only 3,000 in the US, it is exclusive and some critics say cult 
like, claiming members practice self-mortification and self-flagellation to share the pain 
of Christ. By 1981, longtime Hanssen friend, Paul Moore, grew tired of lectures from 
Hanssen regarding visits to strip clubs for farewell parties with co-workers. Hanssen 
claimed it was an occasion of sin to do that. 
4.3.5  Hanssen Assigned to Washington (1981-1985). 
From January 1981 to September 1985, Hanssen was assigned to the FBI 
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., first to the Budget Unit and then to the Soviet 
Analytical Unit [28]. In 1983, the Hanssen’s 5th child, Greg, was born. Hanssen was 
promoted when he moved into the Soviet Analytical Unit. During this period, Hanssen 
claimed that educating his kids in Opus Dei schools would hopefully lead to a new world 
order in the future that his children could possibly lead. Somehow, Hanssen sent six 
children to exclusive and very expensive schools on a limited income. In 1985, the 
Hanssen’s last child, Lisa, was born.  
4.3.6  Hanssen Betrays Again (1985-1987). 
Hanssen was reassigned to New York to work in the FBI Field Office Intelligence 
Division in September 1985. Just prior to Hanssen’s arrival in New York, his boss 
claimed the FBI needed to recognize that the pay was low, the cost of living was high, 
and that it was easier to lure an agent to the other side. Hanssen arrived and witnessed 
first hand how expensive it was compared to his pay of $34,000 per year. In October 
1985, after a five-year hiatus from espionage, Hanssen sent a letter outlining his intent to 
sell secrets to his Soviet handlers at the home of a Soviet embassy official [29]. In another 
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letter, Hanssen detailed how to transfer information and payments via secret drop 
locations and signals [28].  
Between 1985 and 1991, Hanssen gave up 6,000 pages and 26 disks of secret 
documents, including nuclear deployment plans and satellite positions, and the identities 
of at least nine Soviets who were spying for the US or being recruited to spy [30]. At least 
two of the Soviet spies that Hanssen identified were eventually executed and one 
imprisoned as a result of his information [31]. In return he received over $600,000 (plus 
$800,000 in a Moscow bank), some jewelry (reportedly diamonds [31]) and a Rolex 
watch [27]. 
In 1985, Hanssen ended public displays of affection with his family, appearing 
busy and distracted, due to an important job. During his second tour in New York, fellow 
employees dubbed him “Doctor Death” because of his shallow complexion and 
predilection for wearing the same black suit five days per week [25]. Others nicknamed 
him “Digger” and “The Mortician” because of his slight stoop and aloof demeanor [30]. 
During this period, Vlad Azbell, a part time New York counter-intelligence document 
translator witnessed Hanssen ignoring sensitive info about the Soviet Union, not 
processing it through proper channels and discarding info, but did not report it. Later, 
when he did report it, the report was ignored and Hanssen retaliated by having Azbell 
undergo polygraph testing because he was Russian.  
4.3.7  Continued Espionage (1987-1991). 
In 1987, Hanssen was once again assigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., where he remained for the rest of his career, holding various positions, including 
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Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence Division’s Soviet Analytical Unit (1987-
1990), Inspector’s Aid in Headquarters Inspections Staff (1990-1991), Program Manager 
in the Soviet Operations Section (1991-1992), Chief of National Security Threat List Unit 
(1992-1994), FBI’s Washington Field Office (8 months in 1994), Office of the Assistant 
Director for the National Security Division (1994-1995), FBI’s senior representative to 
the Office of Foreign Missions of the US Department of State (1995-2001) and finally, 
after suspicions were raised, Hanssen was assigned to the Information Resources Division 
(2001), where he was constantly monitored [28].  
Shortly after arriving in Washington, Hanssen put an $80,000 cash down payment 
on his $205,000 house after only receiving $47,000 profit for his New York home. In 
1987, once again, Hanssen enrolled his children in expensive elite Opus Dei schools, on 
barely $60,000 per year salary. In 1988, Hanssen paid cash for $80,000 in home 
improvements, to include a finished basement, recreation room, fireplace, television, 
computer, and deck, and his wife even wondered how they could afford it. By 1989, 
Hanssen was a self-taught computer hacker and programmer, and expressed excessive 
interest in hacking. He also tried to convince the FBI, members of his family, and his 
Soviet handlers to become “wired” and attempted to bring them into the electronic age.  
In 1989, the FBI began investigating the claims that State Department official 
Felix Bloch was working with Soviet agents. When Hanssen found out about it, he told 
his handlers, and saved Bloch from capture. Hanssen later mulled around in his 
supervisors office agonizing over who could have possibly tipped off Bloch. Hanssen was 
promoted in 1990 in conjunction with his move to the FBI Headquarters Inspections 
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Staff. In 1990, records indicate that Hanssen gave his brother-in-law, George Beglis, 
several thousand dollars to buy a Mac 2 computer for his architectural firm.  
In 1990, Hanssen “befriended Priscilla Sue Galey, a stripper who became addicted 
to cocaine, but believed he was absolved since no sex ever took place.” [27] He believed 
he was saving her, by buying her a Mercedes (even though his wife was still driving an 
older minivan), fixing her teeth, buying her jewelry, and giving her a credit card. He 
eventually spent over $100,000 on her and even took her with him on a business trip to 
Japan [25]. Later, in 1992, when she got hooked on cocaine and started spending extra 
money on the credit card, Hanssen took it away and abandoned her, even when she was 
arrested and phoned him for help [27]. 
4.3.8  Communism Falls, but Hanssen’s Behavior is Still Suspect (1991-1998).  
In 1991, when communism was declared dead, Hanssen went underground [27]. 
In 1992, James Bamford, an investigative author, was sent to Moscow to interview Viktor 
Cherkashin, Hanssen’s handler, about which Hanssen expressed excessive interest in 
seeing the extra film footage, worried that something might have been said that could 
have compromised him. Later, Bamford noticed Hanssen’s excessive interest in the Felix 
Bloch case. Hanssen reveled in showing others how much smarter he was than his 
superiors and in 1992, to make a point that the FBI had serious security holes in its 
systems, Hanssen hacked into his boss’ computer [25]. Between 1992 and 1996, the 
Hanssens receive several traffic violations as they attempted to maintain their busy 
lifestyle.  
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In 1993, Hanssen physically assaulted Kim Lichtenberg, an FBI administrative 
assistant, after she left early from a meeting in his office [27]. During the investigation, 
Lichtenberg swore in a statement to Richard Spicer and Garrett Davis (FBI investigators) 
that Hanssen grabbed and shook her a few days earlier in front of witness agent Frank 
Figluisi. She also claimed that Hanssen touched Betsy Carroll, an FBI employee, in ways 
that made her uncomfortable, and that Hanssen had a habit of walking up to desks and 
just staring at employees. When asked if he needed help, he would say no and walk away. 
Lichtenberg filed charges with the police, but the case was not prosecuted because the 
FBI said it was an internal affair, however, Hanssen was suspended for five days because 
of the incident [27]. Later that year, Lichtenberg claimed Hanssen was always hacking 
into someone's computer hard drive and pointing out how easy it was to get their 
classified info and that "there were a lot of reasons to look into Hanssen." [26]  
In 1994, Bamford was exposed to Hansen's fixation with Opus Dei, Catholicism, 
and fighting the godless commies, which he found too much to handle. In 1995, David 
Major, Hanssen supervisor, noticed the same zeal, and said Hanssen put religion into 
most conversations, saying that without religion, man is lost. In 1997, Earl Edwin Pitts, 
another counter-intelligence double agent, was captured by the FBI. During his 70-hour 
debriefing, he was asked if he knew anyone at FBI headquarters working for the Russians. 
Pitts said he did not, but he knew of a few odd incidents with Hanssen and talked about 
him hacking into others’ computers. The FBI said that they knew about it and ignored it. 
 
 
 77 
4.3.9  Everything Happens in Threes (1999-2001). 
 In 1999, after an eight-year break from espionage, Hanssen resumed contact with 
his now Russian handlers and continued to sell secrets until his capture in February 2001 
[28]. In 1999, despite all of Hanssen’s religious fanaticism, he bragged to co-workers 
about having a middle-aged crush on “hottie” Catherine Zeta-Jones. It also appears that 
Hanssen became more sexually deviant towards the end of his career. “In the months 
prior to being caught, Hanssen spent hours in his basement cruising porn sites, even 
posting masturbatory fantasies online and using the real name of his wife and friends.” 
[27] He even boasted of secretly setting up a camera in his bedroom so an old friend 
could watch the Hanssens having sex, claiming his wife “may be the only teacher at the 
elite girl’s school…who is also a porn star!” [30]  
In November 2000, Russian double agent Sergey Tretyakov turned over all of 
Hanssen’s dead drop packages containing all the information he disclosed to his handlers. 
Tretyakov did not know who the American double agent was, but the FBI found 
Hanssen's fingerprints on the packaging and put him under constant surveillance. In 
February 2001, Hanssen was caught red-handed at a dead drop and taken into custody. He 
later agreed to a deal with prosecutors to avoid the death penalty by fully cooperating 
with authorities. He is currently serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility 
of parole; he is 62.  
4.3.10  Hanssen’s Initial Response Vector. 
Hanssen worked for the FBI, so the model works nicely as it is populated thus far, 
because the FBI is a US government agency that uses the Adjudicative Guidelines for its 
 78 
employees as well. Based on Adrian Havill’s account of Hanssen’s life before the FBI 
[26], it is clear that Hanssen was extremely intelligent, earning a bachelor of science 
degree in chemistry from Knox College in 1966, gaining entrance into the highly 
competitive Northwestern University’s dental school and transferring into Northwestern’s 
prestigious Kellogg School of Management where he earned an MBA in accounting. 
Hanssen felt that he was smarter than most people around him, often bragging about it. In 
addition, prior to joining the FBI, Hanssen joined the Chicago Police Department. While 
attending the Police Academy, he was pulled out of class, enrolled in the police 
department’s secret C-5 unit, and sent off to a covert espionage center to learn counter-
intelligence. Hanssen excelled in the section, but was told by his supervisor that he was 
too smart for the street and should join the FBI. Given this background, Hanssen’s Initial 
Response Vector represents him at the beginning of his FBI career (Figure 29). He 
exhibited a moderate level of stress and had just received a Top Secret security clearance 
in a high profile job at the FBI. His self-esteem was high and he was definitely confident 
in his abilities to do his job, as he was over qualified for the position. 
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Influence
Response 
Vector
Stress 1
Have Criminal record 0
Self Esteem -1
Use of legal substances (Caffeine, Nicotine, Social drinking) 0
Use of Narcotics/Addictions (alcoholism, gambling) 0
S/TS clearance 2
High profile job 1
Satisfaction with company/organization 0
Expectations for advancements (promotion/pay raise) 0
job security/stability 0
workload, quantity/ability to meet deadlines 0
Amount of and ability to deal with complex technology 0
Experience required for job -1
Community involvement 0
Relationship with family 0
social commitments (relationship w/friends or foreign influence) 0
Involved in illicit/illegal relationships 0
Religious practices 0
Satisfaction with salary 0
family financial stability/security (debt, savings, retirement, etc.) 0
Relationship with Co-workers 0
desire to cover for inadequacies 0
Greed 0
Feeling of invincibility - can't get caught 0
Name recognition (narcissism) 0
Experienced rejection 0
Opportunity (lack of Organized Defense) 0
Satisfaction with country/politics (patriotism) 0
State of the Economy 0
concern for world condition (foreign preference) 0
 
Figure 29.  Hanssen’s Initial Response Vector 
 
4.3.11  Hanssen’s Career Stimuli. 
Lastly, Hanssen’s Career Stimuli were generated. What follows here is a brief 
description of the observable situations that occur during Hanssen’s career, the year in 
which they occur, and the specific events in the Event Matrix they correspond to. Note 
the specifics of these events were once again drawn from Adrian Havill’s book [26]. In 
total, there are 46 events listed, starting with his entrance into the FBI in 1976 and ending 
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shortly before his capture in 2001 (Figures 30 and 31). These events are based on 
observed or reported incidents by the FBI or someone close to Hanssen that could have 
reported the incidents. Note, Hanssen’s Initial Score is shown in 1975, just prior to his 
acceptance into the FBI. 
 
Year Description Stimulus
1976 Sworn in to FBI
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1976 Assigned to Indianapolis
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1976 Assigned to Gary Indiana
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1977 3rd Child (John) Born
Change in Family 
(positive)
1978 ASSIGNED to NYC Aug 78 - Jan 81
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1978 "I wanted to be a spy ever since I was a child." Alarming Statement
1978 Bonnie says she and Bob had a secret Swiss bank account. Alarming Statement
1980 4th Child (Mark) born
Change in Family 
(positive)
1981 ASSIGNED to DC Jan 81 - Sep 85
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1982
Lectures long time friend against going to strip clubs for farewell parties with co-
workers, saying that it was an occasion of sin to do that. 
Scrupulosity (Religious 
Fanaticism)
1983 5th child (Greg) born
Change in Family 
(positive)
1983 Promotion to Soviet Analytical Unit 
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1984
Educating his kids in Opus-Day schools, so they could lead a new world order 
in the future.
Scrupulosity (Religious 
Fanaticism)
1985 6th child (Lisa) born
Change in Family 
(positive)
1985 ASSIGNED to NYC Sep 85 - Aug 87
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1985 Bob's boss said that the FBI needed to be aware that the pay was low. Salary anomaly
1985 Pay is not commiserate with the job. Salary anomaly
1985 Public displays of affection, though always rare, had ended. Personality Quirk
1986
Vlad Azbell, a part time NY counter intelligence document translator, claimed 
that Bob was ignoring sensitive info about the Soviet and not process it 
through proper channels.
Reported Insider 
Transgression
1986
Vlad did say something, and nothing was done about it. Bob sought revenge 
and had to undergo polygraph testing - Vlad was Russian. 
Reported Insider 
Transgression
 
Figure 30.  Hanssen’s Career Stimuli (part 1) 
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Year Description Stimulus
1989
Bob's boss, David Major, recalled Bob would come into his office and agonize 
about who had alerted Felix Bloch (it was Bob himself). Excessive Interest
1990 Bob got promoted and assigned to the FBI inspection staff. 
Change in work 
environment (positive)
1990
Records show that Bob gave his brother in law, George Beglis, several thousand 
dollars to buy and Mac 2 computer for his Architectural firm. Unexplained Affluence
1990
Bob meets Priscilla Sue Galey (PSG), stripper at Joanna's club, within days gave 
her several thousand dollars in $100's to get her teeth fixed. Unexplained Affluence
1990 Gave PSG expensive jewelry, flowers. Unexplained Affluence
1991
Gave PSG a 1985 Mercedes 190-E sedan purchased with cash and an American 
Express card. Unexplained Affluence
1991 Bob spends over $80,000 on PSG. Unexplained Affluence
1992
Bob gives up quest to save PSG when she over uses the Credit card and buys 
drugs. Action out of Character
1992
James Bamford goes to Moscow to interview Bob's handler, Viktor Cherkashin, 
and notes Bob expresses a keen interest in seeing the extra film footage Excessive Interest
1992 James Bamford notes Bob's fascination with Felix Bloch Excessive Interest
1992 Traffic tickets for Bob, Bonnie, and the kids. Illegal Activity (Minor)
1993 Abuse of Kim Lichtenberg Illegal Activity (Major)
1993
More accusations of shaking and inappropriate touching at work, in front of 
witnesses. Illegal Activity (Moderate)
1993 More accusations of stalking and harassment at work. Illegal Activity (Moderate)
1993 Bob is suspended for 5 days without pay for KL incident Reprimanded
1993
Lichtenberg claims Bob was always hacking into someone's computer hard drive 
and " there was a lot of reasons to look into Bob."
Reported Insider 
Transgression
1994
Bamford exposed to Hansen's fixation with Opus-Day, Catholicism, fighting of 
godless communists
Scrupulosity (Religious 
Fanaticism)
1995
David Major, Bob's boss notes Bob's religious zeal, and said Bob put religion into 
most conversations
Scrupulosity (Religious 
Fanaticism)
1997 Earl Edwin Pitts, fellow counter Intel double agent is captured and implicates Bob.
Reported Insider 
Transgression
1999 Bob fantasizes about Katherine Zeta Jones in public. Action out of Character
 
Figure 31.  Hanssen’s Career Stimuli (part 2) 
 
4.4  Testing the Model 
The objective of the test is for the model to show a clear difference between 
results generated from Hanssen’s career (a known insider threat) and the results generated 
from the Typical Employee’s “normal” career (not known for causing insider damage). 
The test methodology is as follows: Introduce stimuli from the Typical Employee into the 
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model and then introduce stimuli from Hanssen’s career into the model for comparison. It 
is important that the stimuli are observable (as established above) and that the results are 
plotted on the same graph using the same time scale. The following three sections show 
the RPM outputs, including the score, the linear regression of the score and the change in 
scores versus time, but not the employees’ Current Response Vectors, as they are simply 
used as inputs to the RPM when the next event occurs. 
4.4.1  Typical Employee’s Outputs. 
The Typical Employee started with an Initial Score of 6, which rose to a peak 
score of 1063 and finished at a final score of 946, following the 53 stimuli (Figure 28 
above) entered, one at a time over the course of 13 years, into the RPM (Figure 32). 
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Figure 32.  Typical Employee’s Scores Plotted Through 13-year Career 
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Next, the linear regression of the employee’s scores, show the kind of slope a 
Typical Employee generates, which represents the norm (Figure 33). The regression 
shows an overall slope of approximately 76. 
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Figure 33.  Linear Regression of Typical Employee’s Scores 
 
 The third and final output is the Change in Scores Versus Time. This output is 
most useful because it shows the peaks and valleys of employee risk, significant, because 
a return to zero after a spike, or fluctuations near zero are indicative of normal behavior 
(Figure 34). 
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Figure 34.  Change in Score Versus Time for Typical Employee (by Year) 
 
The significance of this graph is three-fold. First, the change in scores versus time 
is obtainable over any size time window the organization desires. In this case, the time 
period chosen was one year because the data was entered by year, which serves as the 
smallest time unit available for this test. The figure displays the actual periods of time 
when the Typical Employee is at higher risk and when he or she is at lower risk. Second, 
because normal behavior tends to center around zero, as is the case for most of the 
Typical Employee’s graph, it is easy to tell when employees severely deviate from the 
norm. Third, as everyone goes through rough times, depicted in the graph in 2002-2003, it 
is acceptable to see the change in scores increase during bad times, but eventually things 
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return to “normal”, also depicted in the graph in 2004. These results alert security 
personnel to time periods when employees are at increased risk for causing insider 
damage.  
Some organizations want the ability to perform trend analysis by increasing the 
period of time under scrutiny, creating a window, for example. For larger windows, the 
curve smoothes out as the size of the window increases (Figure 35). 
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Figure 35.  Change in Score Versus Time for Typical Employee (over 3 years) 
 
In this case, the time window is 3 years long and examines periods of heightened 
risk more closely. For example, the jump in score between 2002 and 2003, shown in 
Figure 34 above, is not very significant, but when the events of 2003 are looked at in 
 86 
conjunction with the events from 2002, as shown in Figure 35, a different story is told. 
Likewise, Figure 34 shows the employee as “recovered” from the events of the previous 
two years, but Figure 35 shows the trend in the 3-year window, where the employee still 
has a slightly elevated level of risk. Basically, memory has been added, which helps 
security personnel get around the tendency to look at current events in a vacuum, and 
compels them to consider events from recent years when evaluating the current situation.  
4.4.2  Hanssen’s Outputs. 
Hanssen started with an Initial Score of 2, which rose to a peak of 7278 where it 
finished following the 46 stimuli (see Figures 30 and 31 above) entered, one at a time 
over the course of 25 years, into the RPM (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36.  Hanssen’s Scores Plotted Through 25-year Career 
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Shown next, is the linear regression of Hanssen’s scores (Figure 37), which shows 
a much higher slope than seen in the Typical Employee’s scores (Figure 33 above). The 
regression shows an overall slope of approximately 355. 
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Figure 37.  Linear Regression of Hanssen’s Scores 
 
 The Change in Scores Versus Time output really identifies Hanssen as a high-risk 
employee (Figure 38). The time period here is one year, because it is the smallest time 
unit available for the test, but the graph shows huge spikes indicating extreme risk to the 
organization. Unlike the Typical Employee, Hanssen rarely returns to zero, in some cases 
spiking to even higher risk levels before completely returning to a lower risk status. 
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Hanssen’s graph does not tend to center around zero, but rather floats around 100 when 
not injecting large spikes into the curve. 
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Figure 38.  Change in Score Versus Time for Hanssen (by Year) 
 
Performing a trend analysis on the change in Hanssen’s scores over a 3-year 
window produces similar results with slightly smoothed edges (Figure 39). As with the 3-
year window for the Typical Employee, the 3-year time period smoothes out Hanssen’s 
risk levels, but amplifies the level of risk to the organization he poses, exhibited by the 
large change in scale on the y-axis of the graph. Clearly, with outputs such as this, 
security personnel are able to take the appropriate measures to mitigate possible insider 
damage caused by an employee with an elevated risk for causing insider damage. 
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Change in Score over 3-year Window
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Figure 39.  Change in Score Versus Time for Hanssen (over 3 years) 
 
4.4.3  Result Comparisons. 
Hanssen’s score is roughly seven times the Typical Employee’s score, a telling 
figure by itself, but there are some troublesome variables, such as the fact that Hanssen’s 
scores cover a career nearly double the length of the Typical Employee’s career. 
Expecting the score to double because the career length is double is reasonable, but 
multiplying it by a factor of seven is not. Never the less, examining the scores together 
graphically is beneficial, as long as comparisons are made on the same scale (Figure 40). 
This graph shows a clear difference in magnitude between the Hanssen scores and the 
Typical Employee scores, and organizations that wish to set thresholds are able to see 
how easy it is to detect scores that exceed them. So the first RPM output has shown a 
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significant increase in risk in one employee when compared to the other; enough of a 
difference between the malicious insider and the normal insider to warrant an extra look 
by security personnel. 
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Figure 40.  Both Employees’ Scores Plotted on the Same Scale 
 
 The next metric available for comparison is the linear regression of the scores for 
both employees. Again, it is obvious that the Hanssen slope of 355 is larger than the 
Typical Employee’s slope of 76, by a factor of 4. However, looking at the separate graphs 
is misleading, as the linear regression of the Typical Employee’s scores looks much 
steeper than that of the Hanssen scores (see Figures 33 and 37 above). This is due to the 
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difference in the scales, and is alleviated by plotting both sets of scores on the same graph 
(as in Figure 40) and then finding the linear regression of each (Figure 41). 
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Figure 41.  Linear Regression of Both Employees’ Scores Plotted on the Same Scale 
 
 Now, not only does the output make the difference in slopes numerically apparent, 
but also makes it graphically obvious. No longer is the Typical Employee’s slope steeper 
than Hanssen’s slope, and there is actually a quite visible degree of difference between 
the lines. This result is useful for organizations interested in establishing the Typical 
Employee’s slope as the norm before looking for angles of. The second output of the 
RPM has successfully displayed a useful metric for security personnel to use to identify 
employees with increased risk of causing insider damage. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter III, another method of using the linear regression of 
scores is to compare the rise in slopes throughout the employee’s career and compare to 
an established norm. For example, if an organization were to use the Typical Employee’s 
linear regression of scores as the norm, and then track an employee’s score regression 
annually, it might prove useful (Figure 42). Additionally, by plotting the scores annually 
(in different colors), it is easier to see the slopes by year as well. 
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Figure 42.  Linear Regression of Hanssen Scores at Various Points in His Career 
 
Looking at this graph, the organization begins to see a trend, where by 1986, 
Hanssen’s slope is nearly 50 points higher than the norm, and even earlier (not shown 
here), by 1980, very early in Hanssen’s spying career, the slope has surpassed the norm by 
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ten points. This is significant because the primary goal of the RPM is to identify 
employees with heightened risk for causing insider damage, but it is also useful in 
predicting heightened risk early, potentially reducing the amount of damage an insider 
inflicts. 
As with the previous outputs, more information is gained about employee risk 
levels and their potential for causing insider damage from a comparison of employees 
against the Typical Employee. In addition, as with previous outputs, the Change in Score 
Versus Time metric proves most useful when plotting both employees on the same scale 
(Figure 43). 
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Figure 43.  Change in Score Versus Time for Both Employees (by Year) 
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This graph shows that all but one of Hanssen’s large spikes in risk are larger than 
the largest spike found on the Typical Employee’s graph. Additionally, it is clear that 
most of Hanssen’s graph sits well above the majority of the Typical Employee’s graph. In 
other words, for a vast majority of the time, Hanssen’s scores are increasing more than 
the Typical Employee’s score increase. This certainly indicates the increased risk Hanssen 
poses over the norm, not to mention the indicator exposed by the large spikes on the 
Hanssen graph that dwarf the largest spike in the normal graph. 
 Unlike with the separate 3-year window graphs of the employees, security 
personnel are better able to leverage the quality of information gained by a 3-year window 
graph of both employees on the same scale (Figure 44). 
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Figure 44.  Change in Score Versus Time for Both Employees (over 3 years) 
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This graph magnifies the extent to which Hanssen’s scores are not only higher 
than the Typical Employee’s scores, but also are increasing at a faster rate. Now, if 
security personnel consider events from the previous three years, when analyzing 
Hanssen’s risk, they observe his score increase by about 250 to 300 points in 3-year 
windows during inactive years and anywhere between 500 and 2000 points in 3-year 
windows during active years. When compared with the norm of roughly zero points in 3-
year windows during inactive years and anywhere between 250 and 750 points in 3-year 
windows during active years, it is clear that the RPM is capable of differentiating between 
a normal insider and a malicious one. 
4.4.4  Sensitivity Testing. 
Completing model sensitivity testing is necessary before the model is certified as 
working. It is important to know how small changes in the static matrices affect the 
output scores, slopes, and changes in scores verses time.  
C-code was written to randomly change one value in either matrix. After selecting 
an employee to use during the test, the program evaluates the employee with the model, 
changes one of the matrices, and then re-evaluates the employee with the model. Both 
sets of scores were compared to see how a small change in the matrix affected scores, and 
various affects were expected. For example, if the change to the matrix occurs in a place 
where the influence or event does not have effect over the employee, no change is 
expected. Second, if a change in one of the matrices occurs in a place where the influence 
or event is heavily in force in the employee’s calculations, a larger change is expected. 
Third, if the matrix change only minimally affects the mathematics, then a small amount 
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of change is expected. As a result, various amounts of change are expected, which makes 
watching for change a bad metric to measure the sensitivity of the RPM. Conversely, the 
major purpose of the model is to differentiate between malicious and non-malicious 
insiders, so the obvious metric to look at here is the ability of the model to differentiate 
between the two, given a small amount of change in one of the matrices. 
The C-program is used to change one of the matrices and re-evaluate one of the 
employees (either Hanssen or the Typical Employee) with the RPM. The other employee 
remains unaffected and is compared to the changed employee to see if the model still 
differentiates between the two after one of the matrices has been changed. Either matrix is 
available for testing, using any employee and any amount of change, even large amounts. 
If the influence matrix is selected, the program randomly selects 1 of 30 rows and 1 of 30 
columns to pinpoint the exact cell to modify by the amount of change selected. If the 
event matrix is chosen, the program randomly selects 1 of 27 rows and 1 of 30 columns to 
pinpoint the exact cell to modify by the amount of change. Once the cell is modified, the 
matrix is used as an input to the model along with the other matrix and the chosen 
employee’s vectors. The output is compared to the original output, using the Change in 
Scores Versus Time metric. 320 separate tests were simulated with the following 
distribution (Figure 45). 
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Static Employee Matrix Change Injected
# of Tests 
Perfromed
Typical Employee Event 1 10
Typical Employee Event 2 10
Typical Employee Event 5 10
Typical Employee Event 15 10
Typical Employee Event -1 10
Typical Employee Event -2 10
Typical Employee Event -5 10
Typical Employee Event -15 10
Typical Employee Influence 1 10
Typical Employee Influence 2 10
Typical Employee Influence 5 10
Typical Employee Influence 15 10
Typical Employee Influence -1 10
Typical Employee Influence -2 10
Typical Employee Influence -5 10
Typical Employee Influence -15 10
Hanssen Event 1 10
Hanssen Event 2 10
Hanssen Event 5 10
Hanssen Event 15 10
Hanssen Event -1 10
Hanssen Event -2 10
Hanssen Event -5 10
Hanssen Event -15 10
Hanssen Influence 1 10
Hanssen Influence 2 10
Hanssen Influence 5 10
Hanssen Influence 15 10
Hanssen Influence -1 10
Hanssen Influence -2 10
Hanssen Influence -5 10
Hanssen Influence -15 10
320Total # of Tests Performed
 
Figure 45.  Current Distribution of Sensitivity Tests Performed 
 
Many of the tests resulted in scores changing, but none of the Changes in Score 
Versus Time graphs changed remarkably. Changes to the Influence Matrix were clearly 
more noticeable, because more influences are used in the calculations than events, due to 
most of the events being turned off. A random injection of change to an event that is not 
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used (or unused influence, for that matter, which is less likely) does not result in a change 
in the overall score during the test. Most importantly, in every case, there was still a clear 
differentiation between the Hanssen graph and the Typical Employee graph. None of the 
tests presented a situation where the differences between the graphs became ambiguous. 
The result of the sensitivity testing is significant because it shows that the Risk 
Predictor Model is robust, with changes even as high as fifteen (several times larger than 
the largest matrix value) resulting in minimal change to the overall appearance of the 
Change in Scores Versus Time graphs.  
4.5  Summary 
 This chapter detailed all the steps necessary to populate, test, and analyze the 
results of the Risk Predictor Model, to include an in-depth case study of notorious FBI 
double agent Robert Hanssen. Beginning with the Adjudicative Guidelines used by all US 
government agencies to grant employees security clearances, continuing with a 
description of how the model was populated for the test, an explanation of the Typical 
Employee, and a look at the Hanssen case study, the model was primed for testing. 
Following the test, an analysis of the model outputs was discussed, along with the 
significance of each output observed. Chapter V begins with a discussion on the 
relevance of this research, looks at the importance of the outputs observed, and looks 
ahead to the future. 
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V.  Conclusions 
 
 This chapter wraps up the discussion of the Risk Predictor Model. Chapter IV 
showed the model’s capabilities and the success to which it was capable of assisting the 
fight against insider threat. This chapter discusses the relevance of the model and its 
outputs, as well as possible future work and a brief conclusion to this research. 
5.1  Relevance of the Model 
The model addresses two of the three DoD strategies for mitigating insider threat. 
First, all employees have been granted access to organization assets and therefore 
introduce vulnerabilities. By recognizing that all employees are insiders, and therefore 
threats to the organization, the model considers the relationship between vulnerability and 
threat on the DoD risk model (see Figure 8 above). By focusing on the area of highest 
concern by determining which employees pose the greatest threat to the organization, the 
model reduces the overlap between vulnerability and threat in the risk model.  
It also addresses four of the DoD’s six key elements to minimizing the impact of 
insider threat; establish trustworthiness (of employees), strengthen security practices (by 
providing security personnel with a new tool and a bit more deterrence), detect problems 
(by establishing employees’ risk potentials), and react/respond (by flagging high-risk 
employees). An organization that implements the model learns who is trustworthy, but its 
employees learn as well, because they are assured that anyone causing harm is removed. 
The model is a valuable tool to add to the suite of tools available to the organization’s 
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security personnel as well as more deterrence to keep employees in line. The model 
assists management and security personnel by identifying employees with the highest 
potential of causing harm, as well as correcting unacceptable behavior and holding 
employees accountable for their actions as soon as they cross the line or possibly before 
by providing sufficient records of observable behavior leading up to a potential incident 
of insider damage. 
For the DoD, “the objective is to minimize the impact of the insider threat and to 
minimize the potential damage to DoD information or inflicted on DoD information and 
information systems by significantly reducing information system vulnerabilities to a 
wide range of misuse and abuse.” [3] The objective is not to totally prevent the insider 
threat, because the problem is too big and requires much more research. Instead, the DoD 
has implemented activities designed to combat insider threat while technology is being 
developed. Vigilance Now [3] focuses on security awareness, prevention, and deterrence. 
With DoD emphasis on individual accountability using personnel policies and deployed 
technology, organizations must rely on existing protection technologies and publicized 
deterrence policies to stem the tide of insider damage. Even with maximum employment 
of data mining technologies “to detect anomalous behavior and thus provide advanced 
warning of an increased security risk” [3], insiders are typically caught only after causing 
significant damage. Even by improving deterrence visibly, the DoD recognizes the need 
for more effective “methods and tools that improve deterrence” [3]. The Risk Predictor 
Model augments all of these activities, first by strengthening personnel policies, then by 
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pre-loading data mining activities with data regarding individual employee risk levels and 
finally by serving as an effective method of deterrence.  
The Risk Predictor Model also clearly fits the DoD’s second activity, Vigilance 
Looking Forward from a Strong Foundation [3], which places emphasis on security 
awareness, improving personnel security practices, and continued research in Information 
Technology (IT) systems and personnel management. This activity tries to place the focus 
on heightening security awareness, rather than on mitigating insider threat with IT, which 
is an essential aid, but not a solution. Although The Risk Predictor Model is classified as 
IT and certainly not a solution to insider threat, it clearly heightens security awareness by 
identifying the personnel within an organization that have increased risk of causing 
insider damage. Likewise, in establishing personnel security practices, the DoD states 
“mitigating the insider threat begins with personnel selection and determination of 
suitability for service.” [3] Basically, the DoD expects certain behaviors from insiders, 
right from the beginning. The Risk Predictor Model, populated using the 13 Adjudicative 
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, has the 
potential to continue to screen personnel throughout their careers on a continual basis just 
as if they were submitting their initial security clearances. Additionally, the DoD wishes 
to use IT to continue “coordinated, collaborative research and development efforts needed 
to improve authentication, prevention, detection and monitoring” while maintaining 
“empirical information on insider misuse, abuse and maliciousness to evaluate the 
character and significance of insider misuse, abuse and malicious activity.” [3] The Risk 
Predictor Model exactly satisfies this mantra. Finally, the DoD wishes to focus on 
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personnel management by establishing “Employee Assistance Programs for those who, 
through no fault of their own, encounter personal problems for which they are unable to 
cope without assistance” and requiring that “managers and supervisors must live up to the 
expectation that they evaluate personnel effectiveness daily, develop the skills to 
recognize individuals who require special assistance and provide the avenue for them to 
acquire that assistance.” [3] Implementation of the Risk Predictor Model dovetails nicely 
with this last DoD endeavor. The model assists supervisors in recognizing which 
employees are in need of assistance, and produces a record of events and heightened risk 
level. The fact that supervisors evaluate employees regularly ensures the model works to 
it fullest potential. 
5.2  Reflections on the Data Obtained 
The model successfully produced outputs that showed the difference between 
employee total scores, the divergence of slopes between a known insider (Hanssen) and a 
“typical” employee, and most convincingly, the difference between the change in scores 
versus time of malicious and non-malicious employees. Additionally, the model is robust, 
capable of handling large changes in the static matrices with expected change, but 
relatively minimal change to overall employee profiles. If implemented, the Risk 
Predictor Model would aid security personnel by generating clear indicators for flagging 
employees with increased risk for performing insider threat damage. The model has also 
shown that these indicators are available early in a malicious insider’s career, which could 
directly lead to measures that reduce insider threat damage. Finally, the indicators 
produced by the model show potential risk employees pose to becoming an insider, but 
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when coupled with other indicators generated by other models and research, security 
personnel are able to act earlier because the RPM provides them with an indicator of 
potential risk. In other words, one or two indicators from other sources are not enough for 
security personnel to take action under normal circumstances, but armed with predictions 
of which employees have high risk for causing damage, security personnel are prompted 
into action. 
5.3  Future Work 
The Risk Predictor Model uses human behavior concepts to mitigate insider threat 
by predicting which employees are higher risk for becoming malicious insiders. There is 
little research in this area and the model serves as a stepping-stone into further research 
involving human influences and modeling.  
As identified in Chapters III and IV, population of the model is left to 
organization subject matter experts, hopefully with human behavior experience. 
However, further research done by those with human behavior experience to make the 
task of populating the model easier and more accurate is necessary. Finding a way to 
populate the influence and event matrices in such a way as to avoid possibly inaccurate 
results makes the model more useable. For example, an organization that decides 
employees who are late for work more than twice are an extremely high risk for insider 
damage, but conversely chooses to ignore employees who attempt to access unauthorized 
information invariably shows tardy employees as high risk. This is the “garbage in, 
garbage out” principle, but there is inherent danger in this area. The example used here is 
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extreme, but organizations struggle with how to populate their matrices. Further research 
done in the area of human behavior helps alleviate this problem.  
On a more fundamental level, the RPM has only been tested on small examples 
and the one rigorous case study described in Chapter IV. Due to the success the model 
has shown in this research, it has potential use by many organizations, however, 
populating the model using a completely different case study is desirable to ensure similar 
results. 
Finally, the purpose of this research was to show the need for and present a model 
useful to security personnel in mitigating insider threat. A good tool or computer software 
program designed to implement the Risk Predictor Model would significantly improve 
the possibility that the power of the model ends up in the hands of security professionals 
who need it. 
5.4  Conclusion  
Nothing replaces the relationship good supervisors have with their subordinates, 
however, even good supervisors tend to tackle crises in a vacuum. They help their 
employees through the current problem as best they can, often without considering crises 
from the past. A model that tracks these crises over time greatly benefits any 
organization, by bringing a big picture view of the potential danger an employee poses 
based on heightened risk.  
The goals of this research were to establish the need for a human behavior model, 
propose a model, and test it, all with the expectations that it mitigate insider threat. This 
research has met each of these goals. The insider threat problem is a people problem, for 
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it is people who perpetuate the crimes. The better human behavior is understood, the 
better organizations are capable of mitigating the problem. The Risk Predictor Model 
proposed is built on a foundation of human behavior studies. Using influences that affect 
people, rather than tracking emails or logins, gets right to the core of the trouble; human 
nature. Finally, the model was rigorously tested using a known perpetrator of insider 
damage and was successful in clearly differentiating between a known malicious insider 
and a non-threat. As a result, the Risk Predictor Model presented in this research adds to 
the various tools security personnel use to mitigate insider threat.  
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Appendix A:  Sample Populated Influence Matrix 
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Appendix B:  Sample Populated Event Matrix 
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